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Subsidizing Gentrification: A Spatial
Analysis of Place-Based Tax Incentives
Michelle D. Layser*
Place-based tax incentives, such as the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) and
Opportunity Zones incentives, are often used to promote investment in low-income
neighborhoods. However, not all low-income neighborhoods have an equal need for investment
subsidies. Subsidies for investment in already gentrifying neighborhoods, for example, may
reflect inefficient inframarginal investment, and they may lead to inequitable outcomes. Critics
fear that when gentrifying neighborhoods are eligible for tax incentives, they will draw
investment away from the neighborhoods that need it most. However, few studies have provided
empirical analysis to assess whether these concerns have merit. Through a novel geospatial
analysis of the location patterns of tax-subsidized projects, this Article provides new evidence
that critics’ concerns are justified.
This Article analyzes fifteen years of NMTC data to explore the location patterns of
tax-subsidized projects in twenty U.S. cities. It employs two spatial analysis methods, quadrat
density analysis and negative binomial regression analysis, to describe the location patterns of
NMTC projects and their relationship to two variables known to correlate with
gentrification: high vacancy rates and increasing rental rates. The quadrat density analysis
reveals that, in most cities, NMTC project density is highest in eligible census tracts that had
high vacancy rates, increasing rents, or both. The results of the negative binomial regression
analysis confirmed that, in many cities, high vacancy rates or rent increases were statistically
significant predictors of NMTC investment. Together, these results provide new evidence that
gentrifying census tracts may draw tax-subsidized investment away from other eligible areas.
They also suggest that a commonly proposed Opportunity Zones reform—to add statutory
safeguards modeled after those in the NMTC—would fail to prevent tax-subsidized
investment in places that are already gentrifying.
The observed spatial patterns reflect inefficient allocations, limit the NMTC program’s
ability to promote equitable change, and cast doubt about whether federal regulators can
* Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. Versions of this draft were presented at the
UC Irvine Tax Policy Workshop, the Chicagoland Junior Scholars Works-In-Progress Conference, the
2020 Junior Tax Conference, and the University of Toronto Tax Policy Colloquium. This Article has
benefited from thoughtful comments from Professors Alexander Boni-Saenz, Ted De Barbieri, Victor
Fleischer, Rory Gillis, Victoria Haneman, Tracy Kaye, Alexander Lemann, Zachary Liscow, and Blaine
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effectively shape program outcomes. Opportunity Zones are likely to have similarly inefficient
and inequitable outcomes. Therefore, this Article argues that statutory and administrative
reforms are necessary to reduce the frequency at which tax incentives are used to subsidize
investment in neighborhoods that are already gentrifying. This study has profound implications
for the five-billion-dollar-per-year federal NMTC program, the $3.5 billion per year federal
Opportunity Zones program, and state-level tax incentives modeled after these federal
tax laws.
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INTRODUCTION
When the new Opportunity Zones1 tax incentive was created by the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act of 2017,2 it was touted by members of both political parties as a tool
to lift up struggling communities by promoting investment in low-income
neighborhoods.3 State governors acted quickly to designate 8,764 census tracts as

1. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1.
2. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
3. Siri Bulusu, How a Tax Perk Can Turn a Paper Mill into a Fish Farm (Podcast), BLOOMBERG
TAX (May 10, 2019, 1:45 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/how-a-tax-perk-canturn-a-paper-mill-into-a-fish-farm-podcast [ https://perma.cc/9JVL-LCMK ].
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tax-favored Opportunity Zones.4 Tract eligibility was restricted by statute, and for
the most part, governors selected tracts with lower income, higher poverty rates,
and higher unemployment than those that were not selected.5 However, the law has
drawn criticism for targeting investment to neighborhoods that were
already gentrifying.6
Take, for example, Philadelphia. In that city, the census tracts designated as
Opportunity Zones showed “greater signs of economic distress” than eligible tracts
that were not chosen.7 At the same time, officials also “selected a higher proportion
of gentrifying tracts for the program than any other major city.”8 Critics fear that
the designation of gentrifying census tracts like these may undermine program
objectives by attracting investment away from the areas that need it most.9 In other
words, “the program’s usefulness will be undermined if investment is concentrated
in already-gentrifying areas at the expense of other designated tracts.”10
Yet, no existing study has provided empirical analysis to assess whether these
concerns have merit. A significant body of research examines the amount and types

4. OPPORTUNITY ZONES, https://opportunityzones.hud.gov [ https://perma.cc/PS7FXE9P ] ( last visited May 12, 2020 )
5. Ofer Eldar & Chelsea Garber, Does Government Play Favorites? Evidence from Opportunity
Zones 1, 4 (Duke L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Series, No. 2020-28, 2020),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=31001302102706602509409502800012712305904103
804402106411803109403012301400209602010405303904202711409700012512507708611110907201
906102304900100007110408111301112505405004108607312102710808800111602300312200212008
9086002113126019107021120106087118074&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE [ https://web.archive.org/
web/20211005212242/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463541 ].
6. According to one study, gentrifying census tracts had a nineteen percent chance of receiving
Opportunity Zone designation. Jacob Adelman, Philly’s ‘Opportunity Zone’ Tracts Are Some of the City’s
Poorest, and Among Its Biggest Gentrifiers, Fed Finds, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.inquirer.com/real-estate/commercial/opportunity-zones-philadelphia-federal-reservegentrification-poverty-development-20191115.html [ https://perma.cc/HF2V-S7BF ]; Kelsi Maree
Borland, Many Opportunity Zones Are Already Gentrified, GLOBEST.COM (Feb. 14, 2019, 4:00 AM),
https://www.globest.com/2019/02/14/many-opportunity-zones-are-already-gentrified/ [ https://
perma.cc/MSM2-7DA9 ]. Other designations that have drawn critique include wealthy census tracts
that were mistakenly designated due to mapping errors and tracts on college campuses where the
presence of students skewed census survey results. Trump, Inc., An Opportunity for the Rich, WNYC
STUDIOS ( June 19, 2019), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/trumpinc/episodes/trump-incopportunity-for-rich [ https://perma.cc/W6FY-TP6Q ]; Tom Kacich, That’s Rich: Housing Scheme Cuts
Out Poor, NEWS-GAZETTE (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.news-gazette.com/news/tom-kacich-thats-rich-housing-scheme-cuts-out-poor/article_b179355a-f47c-536a-ac1c-ebf2ba059115.html [ https://
perma.cc/XXJ6-65ZU ].
7. Adelman, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also Kathryn Kranhold, There’s No Evidence That Opportunity Zones Benefit Low-Income
Residents and Their Neighborhoods, MOTHER JONES (June 29, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2020/06/theres-no-evidence-that-opportunity-zones-benefit-low-income-residents-and-their
-neighborhoods/ [ https://perma.cc/7KW2-VUWC ] (noting that critics argue that places where
development was already dynamic do not need incentives for redevelopment and describing gentrifying
areas as places that have improperly received Opportunity Zones support).
10. Adelman, supra note 6.
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of investments that take place in response to tax incentives,11 but few studies have
analyzed where investments are made within tax-favored zones.12 If all eligible tracts
are equally likely to attract investment, then the presence of a small number of
gentrifying census tracts may not significantly affect program outcomes. On the
other hand, if gentrifying tracts attract a disproportionate share of investment, then
those designations may undermine program goals.
Data about the locations of Opportunity Zones investment is not yet available
due to the law’s recent enactment, and the failure of the law to require robust
reporting requirements may prevent researchers from accessing such information
for the foreseeable future.13 However, important insights can be gained from
studying a more established tax incentive—the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC).14
The NMTC was recently expanded in December 2020 by the Consolidated
Appropriations Act to provide five billion dollars per year in tax credits for
investment in low-income communities.15
Among the existing tax incentives used to promote economic development,
the NMTC is most structurally analogous to the Opportunity Zones incentive.16
For this reason, it is likely that a study of NMTC investment patterns would be
generalizable to Opportunity Zones. That is, if NMTC investment
disproportionately flows to gentrifying areas, the same pattern is likely to result in
the context of Opportunity Zones. In addition, such results would suggest that a
common reform proposal—to add safeguards to the Opportunity Zones law

11. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-334, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: THE
CREDIT HELPS FUND A VARIETY OF PROJECTS IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES, BUT COULD BE
SIMPLIFIED (2010); Tami Gurley-Calvez, Thomas J. Gilbert, Katherine Harper, Donald J. Marples
& Kevin Daly, Do Tax Incentives Affect Investment?: An Analysis of the New Markets Tax Credit, 37
PUB. FIN. REV. 371 (2009); Kaitlyn Harger & Amanda Ross, Do Capital Tax Incentives Attract New
Businesses? Evidence Across Industries from the New Markets Tax Credit, 56 J. REG’L SCI. 733 (2016);
Richard C. Hula & Marty P. Jordan, Private Investment and Public Redevelopment: The Case of New
Markets Tax Credits, 10 POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 11 (2018).
12. To the author’s knowledge, the only study of this topic is an unpublished dissertation that
analyzes the relationship between New Markets Tax Credit and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit siting
patterns. Michael Henderson, The Locational Patterns and Socioeconomic Effects of the New Markets
Tax Credit and Low Income Housing Tax Credit in Distressed Metropolitan Census Tracts (Apr. 30,
2018) (Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgia State University) (https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/pmap_diss/
71/ [ https://perma.cc/GTG6-FB9R ]).
13. Rebecca Lester, Cody Evans & Hanna Tian, Opportunity Zones: An Analysis of the Policy’s
Implications, 90 STATE TAX NOTES 221, 226–28, 230–31 (2018) (noting that increased reporting would
help researchers and using New Markets Tax Credit data to help inform an analysis of
Opportunity Zones).
14. I.R.C. § 45D.
15. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 112 (2020);
I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(H) (West); see also Martha Groves Pugh & Brian Moore, NMTC Extended Through
2025 with $5 Billion Annual Appropriations, NAT’L L. REV. ( Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/nmtc-extended-through-2025-5-billion-annual-appropriations
[ https://perma.cc/ENR9-J5EC ].
16. Michelle D. Layser, A Typology of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives, 25 WASH. & LEE
J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 403, 449 (2019); Lester et al., supra note 13, at 226.
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modeled after those contained in the NMTC—would be insufficient to prevent
tax-subsidized investment in places that are gentrifying.
For these reasons, this Article analyzes fifteen years of NMTC data to explore
location patterns of tax-subsidized investments in twenty U.S. cities. Specifically,
this study asks whether NMTC allocations have disproportionately flowed to
eligible census tracts that exhibit signs of gentrification. This study employs spatial
analysis methods to describe the spatial patterns of investment and their relationship
to two variables known to correlate with gentrification: high vacancy rates and
increasing rental rates.17 Through this analysis, this Article provides new evidence
that NMTC subsidies have flowed disproportionately to eligible census tracts that
exhibit signs of gentrification.
This Article makes several important contributions to the tax, empirical, and
urban law literatures. First, it contributes to the tax policy literature by providing
new, empirically grounded insights about taxpayer behavior that are essential to
inform the design of effective and impactful place-based tax incentives.18 Second, it
contributes to the empirical literature about taxation by extending spatial analysis
methods, which have more frequently been employed by geographers, to the study
of taxation. Third, it contributes to the urban law literature by providing new
insights about the role of tax incentives within broader urban redevelopment
policy debates.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the history of redevelopment
policies, state-led gentrification efforts, and the role of tax incentives in urban
redevelopment. It situates place-based tax incentives within larger debates about
urban redevelopment. Notably, place-based tax incentives are poised to take on
increased importance in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis as cities seek to
revitalize their economies through new economic development.19 This section
argues that the impact of tax incentives like the NMTC and Opportunity Zones law
will partially turn on whether they promote investment in gentrifying
neighborhoods or whether investment is more broadly distributed.
Part II sets forth a spatial analysis of NMTC investment patterns to
demonstrate that tax-subsidized investment has disproportionately flowed to areas
that exhibit strong signs of gentrification. Focusing on two variables with known

17. For a discussion of variable selection, see Section II.A.
18. The phrase “place-based tax incentive” is often used to describe spatially differentiated tax
laws, including those used to drive investment to low-income areas. Michelle Layser, How Place-Based
Tax Incentives Can Reduce Geographic Inequality, 75 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 4),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=11009907207409002600607206409209107002107803
802804006709108400908111402510300100108704104501600001511109800201512311612312109102
605900402900311208610000108700609208907003603011500307307209511609909208107806706710
3064086095113091110080086108107095098029&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE [ https://web.archive.org/
web/20211005212032/https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3516469 ].
19. Michael Novogradac, Community Development Tax Incentives Poised to Help Spur
COVID-19 Recovery, NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS, May 1, 2020, at 4.
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positive correlations to gentrification—high vacancy rates and rent increases—the
analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I perform a quadrat density analysis to describe
the spatial distribution of NMTC projects in twenty cities. This analysis shows that
project density is consistently highest in eligible census tracts with higher vacancy
rates and higher rent increases than in other eligible tracts.
Second, I employ a negative binomial regression analysis to gain further insight
into the relationship between the key variables and project density, controlling for
additional variables such as racial composition and income levels. Again, this
analysis demonstrates that, in many—but not all—cities, NMTC allocations
increase as a function of increasing vacancy rates and increasing rents. Together,
these analyses present new and surprising evidence that NMTC allocations have
flowed to census tracts that exhibit signs of gentrification.
Part III discusses the policy implications of the empirical analysis. It argues
that the observed spatial patterns reflect inefficient allocations, limit the program’s
ability to promote equitable change, and cast doubt about whether federal regulators
can effectively shape program outcomes. Specifically, these patterns suggest that
the NMTC has resulted in wasteful tax expenditures in gentrifying locations, while
also undermining equity within the tax system and failing to benefit the low-income
communities with the most need. In addition, variation in results across cities raises
new questions about the role of federal regulators in tax incentive administration,
as well as the wisdom of state-level tax incentives modeled after these
federal programs.
Finally, these results have particularly troublesome implications for
Opportunity Zones. For reasons to be explained, the patterns observed in this study
are likely to be even more pronounced in the context of Opportunity Zones, which
lack many of the safeguards included in the NMTC. For this reason, this Article
argues that both laws should require active regulation that includes an evaluation of
proposed project locations. Projects located in areas that are already gentrifying
should be ineligible for tax-subsidized investment under both laws unless the
project actively serves low-income residents. Failure to implement such reforms will
result in wasteful and inequitable outcomes that reinforce structural inequality.
I. PLACE-BASED TAX INCENTIVES AND GENTRIFICATION
A. Gentrification and Urban Redevelopment
Like other redevelopment tools, tax incentives are often used to promote the
redevelopment of distressed neighborhoods.20 There are many reasons why
government intervention in distressed neighborhoods may be desirable. The
presence of abandoned properties may create “fire hazards as well as health and
safety hazards, which can quickly become infested with rodents, sites for illegal
20. See Layser, supra note 18, at 10−12 (describing a shift toward tax-based approaches to
support affordable housing and community development).
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dumping, harbors for criminal activities, or places for vagrants to live.”21 A dearth
of employers in the area may create “spatial mismatch,” whereby distance from jobs
creates a barrier to employment, contributing to persistent unemployment and
poverty.22 Displacement of residents due to poor housing quality may threaten
social networks, leading to less resilient communities that are more dependent on
government safety nets.23 Meanwhile, rehabilitation of the built environment has
been linked to a variety of social benefits, including crime reduction and improved
health outcomes.24
For reasons like these, federal and state governments spend billions of dollars
each year in subsidies aimed to encourage investment in distressed areas. These
subsidies are increasingly delivered through tax incentives.25 From 2005 to 2019, the
annual cost of federal tax expenditures for economic development increased by $3.2
billion.26 For example, the size of the federal New Markets Tax Credit, which has
been used to subsidize redevelopment since 2000, has steadily increased over time
and now provides for five billion dollars of tax credit annually.27 The Opportunity
Zones law is estimated to cost the federal government $3.5 billion in capital gains

21. Victoria Chaney Morckel, Empty Neighborhoods: Using Constructs to Predict the Probability
of Housing Abandonment, 23 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 469, 469 (2013).
22. Christina Stacy, Brady Meixell & Serena Lei, Too Far from Jobs: Spatial Mismatch and Hourly
Workers, URB. INST. (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.urban.org/features/too-far-jobs-spatial-mismatchand-hourly-workers [ https://perma.cc/3NX5-8LVR ].
23. See generally MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN
CITY (2016) (describing the relationships between poor housing quality, evictions, and the detrimental
impact that loss of housing has on low-income communities); Miriam Zuk, Ariel H. Bierbaum, Karen
Chapple, Karolina Gorska & Anastasia Loukaitou-Sideris, Gentrification, Displacement, and the Role of
Public Investment, 33 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 31, 35 (2018) (explaining that displacement often occurs
due to poor housing quality).
24. Charles C. Branas, Eugenia South, Michelle C. Kondo, Bernadette C. Hohl, Philippe
Bourgois, Douglas J. Wiebe & John M. MacDonald, Citywide Cluster Randomized Trial to Restore
Blighted Vacant Land and Its Effects on Violence, Crime, and Fear, 115 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 2946, 2950 (2018); Erica Raleigh & George Galster, Neighborhood Disinvestment,
Abandonment, and Crime Dynamics, 37 J. URB. AFFS. 367, 389 (2015); Hilary Thomson, Mark Petticrew
& David Morrison, Health Effects of Housing Improvement: Systematic Review of Intervention Studies, 323
BRIT. MED. J. 187, 188 (2001) (linking rehabilitation to improved health outcomes).
25. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2005–2009, at 35 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2005) (estimating the
following $1.6 billion of tax expenditures in 2005: $0.4 billion for New Markets Tax Credit; $0.7 billion
for Empowerment Zone Tax Credit; $0.5 billion for Renewal Community Tax Incentive); STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023, at 26 tbl.1 (Comm. Print 2019) (estimating the following $4.8 billion of tax
expenditures in 2019: $1.3 billion for New Markets Tax Credit; $3.5 billion for Qualified Opportunity
Zones),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5238
[ https://perma.cc/
4WUQ-VMNJ ].
26. Id.
27. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 112 (2020);
I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(H).
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relief each year through 2022.28 These federal tax incentive programs also have state
and local counterparts, whereby state and local governments fund similar incentives
to supplement the federal redevelopment initiatives.29
Meanwhile, urban redevelopment in the United States is inextricably linked to
debates about gentrification. Gentrification refers to “the process by which decline
and disinvestments in inner-city neighborhoods are reversed.”30 There is no
established definition for gentrification, but at its core, the term describes
neighborhoods in transition from a low-income neighborhood to a higher income
neighborhood.31 To many, the term also connotes racial transition, whereby
neighborhoods with significant Black or Brown populations turn over to majority
white populations.32
Though many anti-poverty advocates reflexively oppose gentrification, in the
academic literature, “[d]epending on the time and place, gentrification has been seen
as a tool, goal, outcome, or unintended consequence of revitalization processes in
declining urban neighborhoods, which are defined by their physical deterioration,
concentrations of poverty, and racial segregation of people of color.”33 Since an
objective of urban redevelopment is to achieve neighborhood improvements by
rehabilitating the built environment and spurring new economic activity,
gentrification may be viewed as either a goal or a risk of urban redevelopment.
As urban law professor Nestor Davidson explains, “every public investment
in a given place not only has a direct impact on the people in that place but more
importantly shapes the incentives that people have to remain, leave, avoid, or move
to that place.”34 The process by which mobile residents move to achieve their
preferred mix of taxes and amenities is called “Tiebout sorting.”35 If Tiebout sorting
occurs, then one would expect that any successful urban development program that

28. Samantha Jacoby, Final Opportunity Zone Rules Could Raise Tax Break’s Cost, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 3, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/finalopportunity-zone-rules-could-raise-tax-breaks-cost [ https://perma.cc/E4XD-5BVR ].
29. State NMTC Programs, NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/
new-markets-tax-credits/application-allocation/state-nmtc-programs ( last visited Oct. 5, 2021 )
[ https://perma.cc/3TV4-XBWP ]; State Tax Code Conformity – Personal Income, NOVOGRADAC,
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/opportunity-zone-resource-center/guidance/state-taxcode-conformity-personal-income ( last visited Oct. 5, 2021 ) [ https://perma.cc/A2JL-8XUD ].
30. Lance Freeman, Displacement or Succession?: Residential Mobility in Gentrifying
Neighborhoods, 40 URB. AFFS. REV. 463, 463 (2005).
31. Ryun Jung Lee & Galen Newman, The Relationship Between Vacant Properties and
Neighborhood Gentrification, LAND USE POL’Y, Feb. 2021, at 1, 1.
32. Jen Douglas, From Disinvestment to Displacement: Gentrification and Jamaica Plain’s
Hyde-Jackson Squares, 23 TROTTER REV. 1, 13–14 (2016). But see Daniel J. Hammel & Elvin K. Wyly,
A Model for Identifying Gentrified Areas with Census Data, 17 URB. GEOGRAPHY 248, 264 (1996)
(choosing not to include racial transition in a model to predict gentrification from census data).
33. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 32.
34. Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and Community Development
Policy, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2009).
35. Id. at 8.
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results in meaningful neighborhood improvements would attract new residents to
the area.36
Some commonly stated goals of urban redevelopment policies—such as
growing the local tax base or achieving socioeconomic and racial integration—seem
to assume that gentrification and Tiebout sorting will occur.37 Arguably, the
purpose of urban development is to expand the amenities available in distressed
neighborhoods, thereby making those neighborhoods more attractive places for
people to live and work.38 Alternatively, gentrification may be viewed as a risk
of—or a constraint on—successful urban development initiatives. For example,
urban green space strategies to advance social equity “may be paradoxical, in that
the creation of green space to facilitate real estate can ultimately lead to
gentrification and the displacement of various residents, thus alleviating social
inequity by benefiting citizens unequally and pricing out vulnerable residents.”39
B. Tax Incentives and Urban Redevelopment
1. From Slum Clearance to Enterprise Zones
Today’s largest place-based tax incentives, the New Markets Tax Credit and
Opportunity Zones laws, grew out of a long history of government policies that
have supported gentrification—intentionally or not—by directing public and
private capital toward some neighborhoods and away from others.40 Researchers
have noted that “[s]tate policies may amplify already existing gentrification
processes, or alternatively seek to spark gentrification in disadvantaged
neighbourhoods.”41 Some of the first examples of systematic, state-assisted
gentrification were introduced by the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954.42 Under
these laws, the “federal government provided direct grants, and state governments

36. See generally David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127
YALE L.J. 78 (2017) (describing lower than expected rates of mobility and legal barriers to
interstate mobility).
37. See Jason M. Knight & Mohammad Gharipour, Urban Displacement and Low-Income
Communities: The Case of the American City from the Late Twentieth Century, INT’L J. ARCHITECTURAL
RSCH., July 2016, at 6, 14–16.
38. See Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 32.
39. Mengbing Du & Xiaoling Zhang, Urban Greening: A New Paradox of Economic or Social
Sustainability?, LAND USE POL’Y, Mar. 2020, at 1, 9.
40. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 32.
41. Cody Hochstenbach, State-Led Gentrification and the Changing Geography of
Market-Oriented Housing Policies, 34 HOUS., THEORY & SOC’Y 399, 400 (2017).
42. See Norma Nager, Continuities of Urban Policy on the Poor: From Urban Renewal to
Reinvestment, in BACK TO THE CITY: ISSUES IN NEIGHBORHOOD RENOVATION 239, 242 (Shirley
Bradway Laska & Daphne Spain eds., 1980); Jason Hackworth & Neil Smith, The Changing State of
Gentrification, 92 J. ECON. & HUM. GEOGRAPHY 464, 466 (2001) (“Systematic gentrification dates back
only to the 1950s . . . .”); Neil Smith, Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement by
Capital, Not People, 45 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 538, 546 (1979) (describing the state’s role in early
gentrification schemes, in which the state assembled properties at fair market value and sold to
developers at lower assessed prices).

Clean Final Edit_Layser_V2.docx (Do Not Delete)

2021]

SUBSIDIZING GENTRIFICATION

11/8/21 8:16 AM

173

aggressively assisted their corporate-led local urban renewal authorities in
gentrification by ‘assembling properties at fair market value and returning them to
developers at the lower assessed price.’”43
These early urban renewal policies relied heavily on slum clearance, which
inflicted significant harm on low-income communities through widespread
displacement of residents.44 As of June 30, 1966, over 400,000 units had been
cleared (or scheduled for clearance), “forcing the relocation of over 300,000
families.”45 For this reason, “urban renewal became synonymous with a clearance
project of any sort.”46 Moreover, the disproportionate numbers of minorities
affected by these policies led some critics to argue that “urban renewal really meant
[Black] removal,”47 which was often accomplished by constructing
interstate highways.48
For example, in Hamtramck, Michigan, the city’s 1959 master plan “called for
a ‘program of population loss,’ understood to refer to its small number of African
American residents.”49 Pursuant to this plan, the city used federal urban renewal
funds to “demolish African American neighborhoods,” clearing land for the
expansion of a Chrysler automobile manufacturing plant and the Chrysler
Expressway (I-75).50 In Miami, Florida, a similar highway project was used to reduce
“a community of 40,000 African Americans to 8,000,” and in Camden, New Jersey,
interstate highway projects “destroyed some 3,000 low-income housing units from
1963 to 1967.”51 In Los Angeles, the “routing of the Santa Monica Freeway in 1954
destroyed the city’s most prosperous Black middle class area, Sugar Hill.”52
Frustration over the destruction caused by these policies “provoked a political
revolt against ‘urban renewal,’”53 which became a flash point in the Civil Rights
Movement of the 1960s.54 Ultimately, the urban renewal program was terminated
in 1974.55 After the early urban renewal program was discontinued, subsequent
urban redevelopment strategies relied on public-private partnerships and,
increasingly, indirect support for gentrification through tax incentives.56

43. Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives
and a Path Toward Community Oriented Reform, WIS. L. REV. 745, 776 (2019).
44. William J. Collins & Katharine L. Shester, Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal in the United
States, 5 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 239, 241–42 (2013).
45. Id.
46. Alexander von Hoffman, The Lost History of Urban Renewal, in THE AFFORDABLE
HOUSING READER 14, 25 ( J. Rosie Tighe & Elizabeth J. Mueller eds., 2013).
47. Id. at 26.
48. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 127 (2017).
49. Id. at 128.
50. Id. at 128–29.
51. Id. at 129.
52. Id. at 130.
53. von Hoffman, supra note 46, at 26.
54. Layser supra note 43, at 777.
55. Id. at 778.
56. Id.
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Among the earliest examples of tax incentives used to support urban
redevelopment were state enterprise zone laws.57 States began introducing versions
of enterprise zone laws in 1981, and “by the early 1990s, thirty-eight states and the
District of Columbia had adopted their own enterprise zone legislation.”58 Under
the typical enterprise zone statute, government leaders designated census tracts as
tax-favored zones.59 Though states emphasize different zone designation criteria,
most include some combination of poverty rate and unemployment rate thresholds
among the relevant factors.60
The laws generally provide for tax relief (e.g., hiring or investment tax credits,
capital gains relief, sales tax exemptions, or property tax abatements) and regulatory
relief (e.g., relaxed permit requirements) for businesses that are located within the
zones.61 The tax-based subsidies provide a boost to businesses in enterprise zones
and an incentive for businesses to locate in (or shift to) the zones.62 However, these
subsidies do not provide for the large capital infusions typically needed to fuel new
real estate construction or rehabilitation.63
A federal version of enterprise zone laws was passed by the Clinton
Administration in 1993.64 The new tax law created nine “empowerment zones” and
ninety-five “enterprise communities.”65 Although the enterprise zone concept had
long been popular among conservatives, Clinton’s version drew criticism from
conservative circles. Republican Congressman Jack Kemp, one of the earliest
proponents of the enterprise zone approach, “called Clinton’s plan ‘anemic’ and
‘anti-capitalistic’” and criticized the incentives as “weak and incomplete, with
virtually no incentives to encourage entrepreneurs or small businesses.”66 The
Heritage Foundation strategist who first brought the enterprise zone idea from
Great Britain called the program “worse than nothing.”67
The law also drew criticism from within Clinton’s own party. Democrat
Senator Joseph Lieberman argued that the law offered “excessive benefits for the
nine empowerment zones and a lack of capital incentives.”68 For these reasons,
Sen. Lieberman proposed the creation of “enterprise zone development funds,”
which would enable larger subsidies to flow into the zones.69

57. Id.
58. Id. at 780.
59. Layser, supra note 16, at 416.
60. Id. at 422 n.83.
61. Id. at 417.
62. Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1344 (1993).
63. Layser, supra note 16, at 417.
64. I.R.C. § 1391; Jeffrey M. Euston, Clinton’s Empowerment Zones: Hope for the Cities or a
Failing Enterprise?, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 140, 140 (1994).
65. I.R.C. § 1391.
66. Euston, supra note 64, at 140.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 146.
69. Id.
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Under the proposal, enterprise zone development funds would be “specialized
investment funds that would direct investment exclusively in enterprise zones.”70
They would be closed-end funds and tradeable on stock exchanges, and they “would
permit investors to defer the tax on gains realized from sales of securities and other
capital assets to the extent that they used the proceeds to acquire shares of the
funds.”71 (Lieberman’s proposal never became law, but its parallels to the
Opportunity Zones law introduced in 2017 are undeniable.) Though enterprise zone
development funds were not adopted, another federal tax incentive was enacted in
2000 for the same general purpose of driving large infusions of capital to
low-income areas: the New Markets Tax Credit.72
2. Tax Incentives for Debt and Equity Investment
a. New Markets Tax Credit
New Markets Tax Credits (NMTCs) are tax credits claimed by investors who
contribute capital to Community Development Entities (CDEs), which in turn
invest in projects located in eligible low-income census tracts.73 The NMTC statute
currently authorizes five billion dollars in tax credits to be allocated to CDEs
nationwide.74 These tax credits are awarded pursuant to a competitive application
process administered by the Community Development Financial Institutions
(CDFI) Fund, which is an office within the Department of the Treasury.75 Each
year, CDEs apply to the CDFI Fund for NMTC allocations.76
After the CDFI Fund allocates the tax credits to a CDE, the CDE solicits
investors, which are almost always large financial institutions, to make so-called
qualifying equity investments in the CDE.77 In exchange for that investment, the
70. Id.
71. Id. at 147. The NMTC was introduced in Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, with a total of $15bil authorized for allocation from 2001 to 2007;
extended by Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242,
which extended authorization through 2019 at $3.5 bil/year.
72. DONALD J. MARPLES & SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34402, NEW MARKETS
TAX CREDIT: AN INTRODUCTION NOTE 1 (2016).
73. I.R.C. § 45D(e); Roger M. Groves, The De-Gentrification of New Markets Tax Credits, 8
FLA. TAX REV. 213, 220 (2007). To be eligible, census tracts generally must have a poverty rate of
twenty percent or higher. Id.
74. I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(G).
75. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 1.
76. See generally CDFI FUND, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT
PROGRAM: ALLOCATION APPLICATION FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2020) (describing the
NMTC application process).
77. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 2–3. Investors generally do not expect significant
market returns on these investments. HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, NEW MARKET TAX CREDIT BASICS
3 (2013), http://services.housingonline.com/nhra_images/NMTC%20Basics.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
3KGP-7YR4 ]. Rather, they expect to profit primarily from the use of tax credits, which the CDE is
authorized to pass along to investors. Id. To achieve this result, investors size their capital contributions
according to the value of tax credits that they expect to receive in connection with the investment. Id.
According to the Congressional Research Service, the “tax credit markets historically set a price of 70
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CDE promises to pass the NMTCs along to the investors, who will claim the tax
credits on their tax returns.78 The CDE then uses the newly raised capital to make
capital contributions to developers or businesses in the tax-favored zones.79 In
practice, these contributions are called “Qualified Low-Income Community
Investments” (QLICIs), and they almost always take the form of debt.80 The basic
transaction structure is summarized in the diagram below.

Through this structure, the NMTC helps provide large infusions of capital into
projects, helping to support new construction, rehabilitation, and large development
projects, among others.81 An analysis of all NMTC allocations made through 2019
reveals that the average QLICI equaled 73.6% of estimated project costs, with the
median QLICI covering 84.56% of estimated project costs.82 For the 39.8% of
projects that were real estate transactions, the average QLICI equaled 68.1% of
project costs, and the median QLICI covered 75.7%.83 These QLICIs, which are

to 80 cents per dollar of tax credit,” with lower valuation in years when credit markets are tight and
corporate profits are small. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 7. This result is achieved using
leveraged structures. In a basic transaction, the tax equity investor and a debt lender will contribute to
an investor-owned fund that, in turn, makes a qualified equity investment in the CDE. For example, a
tax equity investor may contribute 31 cents of every dollar, while the lender provides 69 cents of every
dollar. Every dollar of qualified equity investments generates 39 cents, the entire amount of which is
passed to the tax equity investor. In this way, the tax equity investor is able to generate a larger return
on its investment.
78. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 3.
79. Id.
80. Id; see also John Sciarretti, Michael Novogradac & Peter Lawrence, New Opportunity Zones
Could be Used to Finance Rental Housing, NOVOGRADAC (Feb. 23, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://
www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/new-opportunity-zones-could-be-used-finance-rentalhousing [ https://perma.cc/QF8V-KNJW ] (noting that “business investments under the NMTC
program are almost always debt”).
81. Layser, supra note 43, at 768.
82. Data on file with author.
83. Data on file with author.
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provided to real estate developers in the form of loans, are subsidized through the
tax credit program.84
The NMTC has been criticized for failing to ensure that benefits flow to
residents of low-income communities.85 Because the statute places few restrictions
on the types of projects that can be supported through the program,86 it has been
used to subsidize projects like museums and opera houses that are not well targeted
to benefit poor residents.87 Meanwhile, the census tract eligibility criteria permit a
significant proportion of census tracts to qualify for NMTC financing in many
cities.88 Inevitably, the pool of eligible census tract includes gentrifying
neighborhoods, and the NMTC has the potential to subsidize further investment in
those areas. For reasons like these, critics have long called for the
“de-gentrification” of the NMTC,89 though limited research has explored the
relationship between the NMTC and gentrification empirically.90
b. Opportunity Zones
Despite the relatively large infusions of capital provided by the NMTC, many
community development industry participants consider the tax credit to be a
relatively small subsidy compared to project costs, particularly in the context of real
estate development.91 Since the NMTC is a debt-subsidy, it typically is not the lead
source of project financing.92 For this reason, some community development
industry participants saw a continued need for a subsidy for equity investment in
low-income areas.93 The new Opportunity Zones tax incentive introduced in the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 filled this gap.
Under the law, state governors chose from a pool of eligible census
tracts—roughly defined as NMTC-eligible tracts, Empowerment Zones, and
certain contiguous census tracts—to designate 8,764 census tracts as Opportunity

84. See John Sciarretti & George Barlow, Pairing NMTCs with Opportunity Zone Incentives, 9
NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS, April 2018, at 2, https://www.novoco.com/periodicals/articles/
pairing-nmtcs-opportunity-zone-incentives [ https://perma.cc/YDK9-3JLT ] (explaining that NMTCs
are generally used to subsidize loans to qualified active low-income businesses).
85. Groves, supra note 73, at 223.
86. I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(a).
87. Groves, supra note 73, at 216.
88. See I.R.C. § 45D(e). For example, in Chicago 527 out of 808 census tracts (65%) were eligible
for NMTC allocations in 2018. Data on file with author.
89. Groves, supra note 73, at 216.
90. Henderson, supra note 12, at 101–21.
91. Democracy
Collaborative,
Policy
Guide:
New
Markets
Tax
Credit,
COMMUNITY-WEALTH.ORG,
https://community-wealth.org/strategies/policy-guide/nmtc.html
[ https://perma.cc/C2FF-6GDW ] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021 ).
92. Id.
93. See Bulusu, supra note 3 (describing the ways that Opportunity Zones incentives were
envisioned to supplement earlier incentives like the New Markets Tax Credit).
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Zones.94 The law provides tax benefits to individual or institutional investors who
make eligible investments in so-called Opportunity Funds that make equity
investments in the designated Opportunity Zones.95 In this way, the Opportunity
Zones law enables large capital infusions like the NMTC. But unlike the NMTC,
which is used to provide debt capital to qualifying businesses, the Opportunity
Zones law promotes equity capital investment in low-income communities.96 By
providing tax benefits to third-party investors, the law provides a significant boost
to downstream businesses by enabling them to attract equity capital that may
otherwise be unavailable.97
The low-income tracts that were designated as Opportunity Zones varied with
respect to factors that may indicate need—such as income level, poverty rates, and
the prevalence of vacant or abandoned properties.98 Analyses of designated tracts
have shown that, for the most part, governors selected tracts with lower income,
higher poverty rates, and higher unemployment than those that were not selected.99
However, multiple news reports have described Opportunity Zones in
gentrifying neighborhoods that were already on an upward trajectory.100 Critics fear
that these designations will attract investment away from the areas that need it
most101 or even fuel the gentrification process.102 Among the most commonly
proposed reforms is to add safeguards to the Opportunity Zones law akin to those
included in the NMTC.103 These include regulatory oversight by the CDFI Fund, a
competitive application process, and a certification requirement for
Opportunity Funds.104

94. Opportunity Zones Resources, CMTY. DEV. FIN. INSTS. FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/
Pages/Opportunity-Zones.aspx
[ http://web.archive.org/web/20210123202534/https://www.
cdfifund.gov/Pages/Opportunity-Zones.aspx ] ( last visited Jan. 23, 2021 ).
95. I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(a) (“In the case of gain from the sale to, or exchange with, an unrelated
person of any property held by the taxpayer, at the election of the taxpayer gross income for the taxable
year shall not include so much of such gain as does not exceed the aggregate amount invested by the
taxpayer in a qualified opportunity fund during the 180-day period beginning on the date of such sale
or exchange . . . .”).
96. Sciarretti et al., supra note 80.
97. Melissa Doell & Sunrita Sen, Opinion, Are Opportunity Zones Really Creating Opportunities?,
IND. LAW. (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/49870-doell-sen-areopportunity-zones-really-creating-opportunities [ https://perma.cc/9CFA-8U6Z ].
98. Layser, supra note 18, at 56.
99. Eldar & Garber, supra note 5, at 2.
100. Borland, supra note 6.
101. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
102. Melody Carter, Federal Opportunity Zones: The Newest Gentrification Tool? (May 2019)
(Master’s thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology), https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/
handle/1853/61326/carter_melody_-_op_final.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [ https://perma.cc/
F2PS-TMB7 ] ( last visited Oct. 5, 2021 ).
103. See, e.g., Joseph Bateman, How Do Opportunity Zones Differ from Existing Federal Tax
Incentives for Community Development?, SUMMIT LLC (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.summitllc.us/blog/
how-do-opportunity-zones-differ-from-existing-federal-tax-incentives-for-community-development
[ https://perma.cc/U97Y-AYE9 ]; Layser, supra note 18.
104. Bateman, supra note 103; Layser, supra note 18.
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The next Part provides new, empirical evidence that such reforms may be
insufficient to prevent Opportunity Funds from investing in gentrifying
neighborhoods. Specifically, a spatial analysis of NMTC projects shows that NMTC
investment has disproportionately flowed to places with strong indicia of
gentrification, even with statutory safeguards. These findings, which cast serious
doubt on the effectiveness of place-based tax incentives, have important
implications for policymakers considering whether to use tax incentives to aid in
the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.105
II. A SPATIAL ANALYSIS OF NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT PROJECTS
Despite the long history of place-based tax incentives, limited research has
analyzed where investments are made within tax-favored zones.106 If gentrifying
census tracts attract a disproportionate share of tax subsidies, this would raise
significant questions about the efficiency, equity, and administration of place-based
tax incentives. It would also provide strong evidence that the designation of
gentrifying census tracts as Opportunity Zones may be cause for concern.
Data about the locations of Opportunity Zones investment is not yet available,
and a lack of robust reporting requirements may prevent researchers from accessing
such information for the foreseeable future.107 For this reason, this study focuses
instead on the NMTC. Insights about the NMTC program are relevant for at least
three reasons. First, they are relevant to evaluate the ongoing federal NMTC
program and many state-level NMTC incentives modeled after the federal law.108
To the extent that inefficiencies and inequities exist at the federal level, those
problems may additionally impact many state policies, thereby necessitating both
federal and state reforms.

105. Michael J. Novogradac, Community Development Tax Incentives Poised to Help Spur
COVID-19 Recovery, 11 NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS, May 2020, https://www.novoco.com/
periodicals/articles/community-development-tax-incentives-poised-help-spur-covid-19-recovery
[ https://perma.cc/T2TA-9YXY ].
106. But see Henderson, supra note 12.
107. Early versions of the Opportunity Zones legislation that were introduced by Sen. Scott
and Sen. Booker had included provisions for annual data collection, but those provisions were removed
from the final version of the law. Lydia O’Neal, Senators to Introduce Opportunity Zone Data Mandates
Bill (2), BLOOMBERG TAX (Apr. 12, 2019, 10:12 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-taxreport/senators-file-bill-to-reinstate-opportunity-zone-data-mandates
[ https://perma.cc/ZH6CS8VT ]; Bob Ibanez, Impact Reporting Is Key Ingredient to Ensuring Successful Implementation of
Opportunity Zone Incentive, NOVOGRADAC (Oct. 10, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/
notes-from-novogradac/impact-reporting-key-ingredient-ensuring-successful-implementation-opportunity
-zone-incentive [ https://perma.cc/QWR9-D56Y ]. Some commentators predict that a new reporting
and public disclosure framework will be introduced and enacted under the Biden Administration. See
Rachel Reilly, EIG OZ Webinar Series | Election Analysis: What Lies Ahead for Opportunity Zones,
ECONOMIC INNOVATION GRP. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://eig.org/news/eig-oz-webinar-serieselection-analysis-what-lies-ahead-for-opportunity-zones [ https://perma.cc/9QRS-82Z5 ].
108. State NMTC Programs, supra note 29.
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Second, NMTC siting patterns can help predict investment patterns under the
Opportunity Zones program.109 The NMTC incentive is structurally analogous to
the Opportunity Zones incentive, making it a good candidate for generating
generalizable findings.110 However, as discussed in Part III below, the Opportunity
Zones law also contains multiple features that one would expect to increase the
likelihood of subsidies flowing to gentrifying neighborhoods, as compared to the
NMTC. For this reason, even slight evidence that NMTC investment flows to
gentrifying census tracts would make it highly probable that Opportunity Funds will
invest in gentrifying tracts.
Third, studying the NMTC can help evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards
that are built into that program. Critics often point to a lack of safeguards in the
Opportunity Zones law as a reason to expect poor outcomes, and some have
suggested that the law be reformed to include guardrails akin to those included in
the NMTC.111 However, if NMTC investment has flowed to gentrifying areas, that
would provide evidence that the safeguards built into the NMTC are insufficient to
prevent this problem. For that reason, Opportunity Zones proposals that rely on
NMTC as a model are likely to fail in this context.
A. Empirical Strategy
Accordingly, this study asks whether NMTC subsidies flow disproportionately
to census tracts that may be experiencing gentrification. I employ two forms of
spatial statistics to analyze location patterns of NMTC allocations in twenty cities
to explore whether NMTC investment has been directed to areas that may be
experiencing gentrification. For reasons explained below, both steps of the analysis

109. See Lester et. al., supra note 13 (using an analysis of the NMTC to help predict Opportunity
Zones outcomes).
110. Place-based tax incentives can be designed as direct or indirect tax incentives. Where direct
tax incentives provide tax benefits directly to entities that invest in low-income communities by
operating businesses in the area or otherwise engaging with the low-income community, indirect tax
incentives provide tax benefits to third party investors who help finance such businesses. Layser, supra
note 16, at 417–18. Both the NMTC and Opportunity Zones incentives provide capital subsidies to
third-party investors who choose to invest in entities that extend capital to businesses in tax-favored
zones. Under both the NMTC and Opportunity Zones laws, the value of the tax subsidy is shared
between third-party investors (who claim the tax preference on their tax returns and therefore receive
a tax reduction) and downstream entities that receive subsidized financing (and can therefore access
financing that may otherwise be unavailable, or can secure such financing more cheaply).
111. See, e.g., Anthony Veerkamp, Opportunity Zones Come into Focus, NAT’L
TR. CMTY. INV. CORP., https://ntcic.com/news-blog/opportunity-zones-come-into-focus/
[ https://perma.cc/L9YQ-WDFZ ] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021 ) (advocating for reforms to promote
“twinning” Opportunity Zones with NMTCs in order to “create guardrails by proxy”); The Promise of
Opportunity Zones: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm. Cong. of the United States, 115th Cong.
(2018) (statement of Maurice A. Jones, President & CEO, Local Initiatives Support Corporation),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg30384/html/CHRG-115shrg30384.htm
[ https://perma.cc/AS6U-VUGF ] (advocating for more active administration of the Opportunity
Zones incentive “in a manner similar to the process for allocating the new markets tax credit”).
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consider how NMTC allocation patterns relate to two variables known to correlate
to gentrification: vacancy rates and rent increases.
First, I use a descriptive quadrat density analysis to describe the point density
of NMTC allocations within each city.112 This geographic research method was
chosen because it produces descriptions of NMTC project data that take into
account the different sizes of census tracts. As a result, the quadrat analysis reveals
whether allocations cluster in areas that may be gentrifying. As described in Part
II.C, the results of the quadrat analysis show that the density of NMTC projects is
consistently highest in census tracts that exhibit signs of gentrification.
Second, I fit a negative binomial regression model to the data to describe the
strength of the relationship between NMTC allocation locations and variables
associated with gentrification.113 This form of regression model is commonly used
to analyze count data, such as the number of projects per census tract. Here, the
model is used to determine whether vacancy rates or rent increases are predictive of
the spatial patterns observed through the quadrat density analysis, after controlling
for other variables that may affect the outcome (e.g., race, income, and changes in
racial or income attributes). As described in Part II.D, the results show that, in many
cities, vacancy rates or rent change are the largest statistically significant predictor
of NMTC allocations.
Taken together, the quadrat density analysis and the negative binomial
regression analysis will answer the question of whether NMTC investment has
flowed to places that exhibit signs of gentrification. Significantly, the purpose of
this analysis is not to test whether tax incentives cause gentrification. Instead, the
purpose is to describe the spatial patterns of NMTC investment to help evaluate
whether the incentive has produced efficient and equitable outcomes. In addition,
the results of this study can help predict how investors will respond to other placebased tax incentives, including Opportunity Zones.
1. High Vacancy Rates as an Indicator of Gentrification
The vacancy rate variable was selected as a key indicator of gentrification
rooted in both theoretical and empirical literatures. Though the presence of vacant
properties may seem counterintuitive to the concept of gentrification,114 such
conditions are consistent with one of the most established supply-side theories
about the gentrification process. Supply-side theories posit that “an oversupply of
112. Y. Yuan, Y. Qiang, K. Bin Asad & T.E. Chow, Point Pattern Analysis, in GEOGRAPHIC
INFORMATION SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY BODY OF KNOWLEDGE (1st Quarter 2020 ed., John
P. Wilson ed., 2020), https://gistbok.ucgis.org/bok-topics/point-pattern-analysis [ https://perma.cc/
9Y7Z-R74G ] (describing quadrat analysis methodology).
113. Jerald F. Lawless, Negative Binomial and Mixed Poisson Regression, 15 CANADIAN
J. STAT. 209 (1987) (describing negative binomial regression models).
114. Peter Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, and Displacement: Connections, Causes, and
Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195, 195 (1985)
(“Abandonment results from demand declining to zero, gentrification from high and
increasing demand.”).
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undervalued urban housing drives investors to redevelop in the hope of tapping
into a latent demand.”115 These theories can be traced to Neil Smith’s rent gap
theory, which predicted “that gentrification is most likely to happen in areas where
there is a wide gap between the potential value of a parcel of land and the current
actual prices.”116
Specifically, Smith argued that capital investment will flow to places where the
rate of return is highest.117 Property is abandoned in some places as capital is
deployed in other, more profitable, locations.118 As structures are abandoned and
left to decay, the market value of property may drop below its potential use value,
creating what Smith calls the “rent gap.”119 When the rent gap is wide enough,
developers can purchase property cheaply, incur rehabilitation costs, and then resell
the property at a profitable rate of return that is satisfactory to the developer.120
Although rent gaps can be found in many neighborhoods that have
experienced decline, Smith argued that reinvestment in any given place rarely occurs
without some form of collective social action.121 Accordingly, “builders, developers,
landlords, mortgage lenders, government agencies, real estate agents, and tenants”
all play important roles in initiating processes of revitalization and gentrification.122
In the context of urban redevelopment initiatives, neighborhoods with significant
rent gaps may gentrify due to the collective action of the state, which bears some of
the risk of investment by providing subsidies, and private developers. Though
Smith’s rent gap theory has been the subject of decades of debate, it remains a
“dominant explanation of the creation of gentrifiable property, which is generally
viewed as an important facet of gentrification.”123
Given the rent gap theory, “[i]t makes sense that gentrification might relate to
abandonment because a certain level of abandonment may be necessary for the first
wave of gentrification to occur.”124 Two recent studies have found that high
vacancy rates are positively correlated with gentrification.125 Geography professor
Victoria Morckel found that, in statistical models, as gentrification increases,
abandonment also increases.126 Morkel notes:
Although counterintuitive, perhaps the gentrification factor indicates that
neighborhoods with a high value on the gentrification factor are
115. Adam Eckerd, Cleaning Up Without Clearing Out? A Spatial Assessment of Environmental
Gentrification, 47 URB. AFFS. REV. 31, 35 (2011).
116. Id.
117. Smith, supra note 42, at 546.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 545.
120. Smith, supra note 117, at 545.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 540.
123. Daniel J. Hammel, Gentrification and Land Rent: A Historical View of the Rent Gap in
Minneapolis, 20 URB. GEOGRAPHY 116, 119 (1999).
124. Morckel, supra note 21, at 488.
125. Lee & Newman, supra note 31; Morckel, supra note 21.
126. Morckel, supra note 21, at 489.
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neighborhoods in transition—that is, neighborhoods with abandonment
that are also experiencing redevelopment and socioeconomic change. If so,
the gentrification factor might predict abandonment by default because
abandonment may covary in the early stages of gentrification as previously
stated. Another potential explanation is that in some neighborhoods
experiencing gentrification, low-income residents move out more quickly
than high income residents move in, leaving vacant units.127
Urban planning professors Ryun Jung Lee and Galen Newman asked whether
clustered vacant properties were associated with the neighborhood gentrification
process and if certain types of vacant properties were more likely to serve as catalysts
for gentrification.128 They found that “clustered residential and commercial
vacancies . . . are positively associated with neighborhood gentrification.”129 Based
on the theoretical and empirical evidence that high vacancy rates are associated with
gentrification, this study uses vacancy rate as an indicator of possible gentrification.
2. Increasing Rent as an Indicator of Gentrification
The rent increase variable was also selected as a key indicator of gentrification
rooted in theoretical and empirical literatures. Where the vacancy rate variable is
grounded in supply-side theories focused on preconditions for the gentrification
process, rent inflation is associated with demand-side theories and the later stages
of gentrification. One articulation of demand-side theories for gentrification posits
that “changing culture and increased costs of commuting have encouraged people
who desire certain amenities and housing close to the urban core to drive prices up
in previously lower class communities.”130
In other words, as demand for living in a neighborhood increases, so does the
price to live there—including rental rates. For this reason, some gentrification
studies have used rent inflation as a standalone proxy for gentrification.131
Professors Lance Freeman and Frank Braconi use increase in market rate rents as
an independent indicator of possible gentrification, noting that “it is the notion that
gentrification leads to increased demand in a neighborhood, and consequently to
rising rents, that is thought to spur displacement.”132 Hammel and Wyley have
developed a model for identifying gentrified areas with census data.133 Though their
model contained nine independent variables, they note that income, occupation,

127. Id.
128. Lee & Newman, supra note 31.
129. Id. at 9.
130. Eckerd, supra note 115, at 35.
131. Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement: New York City in the
1990s, 70 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 39 (2004).
132. Id. at 45.
133. See generally Hammel & Wyly, supra note 32.
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and rent contributed most to the model.134 Rent change, viewed independently, was
a significant variable for accurately predicting gentrification.135
Rent increases have also been observed in case studies of gentrifying
neighborhoods.136 To the extent there is debate over the role of rent change in
gentrification, it relates to the degree of displacement it causes. For example, one
study found that “although rental inflation is related to displacement in gentrifying
neighborhoods, the magnitude of the relationship is rather modest.”137 Another
gentrification study found little, if any, mobility out of gentrifying
neighborhoods.138 However, others have noted that the apparent stability in
gentrifying neighborhoods may reflect heightened efforts by residents to remain in
their improving neighborhoods, “even if it means paying more rent or doubling
up.”139 Since “higher rent burdens are unlikely to be sustainable over the long term,”
it is possible that displacement may occur at later stages of gentrification.140 For
these reasons, this study uses rent increase as an indicator of possible gentrification.
B. Data
1. NMTC Project Data
Two sources of NMTC project data are examined in this study. The regression
analysis is performed using government data available from the Community
Development Financial Institution (CDFI) Fund’s 2019 public data release.141 The
dataset contains the census tract locations of 5,799 NMTC allocations made from
2003 to 2017.142 This comprehensive dataset provides a complete account of where
NMTC investments have flowed during the program’s history.
However, the dataset available from the CDFI Fund does not include project
addresses and is therefore unsuitable for the quadrat analysis performed here. For
this reason, the quadrat analysis is performed using a separate dataset of NMTC
project addresses published online by the accounting firm Novogradac LLP (the
“Novagradac dataset”).143 The dataset contains 5,497 entries that describe projects
that received allocations prior to 2010.144 Using R code, the project addresses were
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 32.
137. Freeman, supra note 30, at 482.
138. Id.
139. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 37.
140. Id.
141. This data is available for download at https://www.cdfifund.gov/sites/cdfi/files/202105/FY2019_Data_Documentation_Instruction.zip [ https://perma.cc/4YNF-8T3P ]. Note that the
file also contains data about four projects with allocation origination years prior to 2003.
142. Id.
143. QLICIs by State, NOVOGRADAC, https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/newmarkets-tax-credits/application-allocation/qlicis-state [ https://perma.cc/BX8G-8TS2 ] ( last visited
Oct. 6, 2021 ).
144. See id. (data on file with author).
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converted to latitude and longitude coordinates, and duplicate points were
removed.145 This yielded 2,978 unique, geocoded projects suitable for
spatial analysis.146
The study sample includes all cities that had at least thirty projects in the
Novogradac dataset. This threshold was intended to ensure sufficient sample size.
The following twenty cities met this cutoff: Milwaukee, New Orleans, Chicago,
Portland, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Jackson, St. Louis, Phoenix, Baltimore, New
York, Cincinnati, Denver, Boston, Columbus, Louisville, Minneapolis, Philadelphia,
Pittsburgh, and Seattle. These urban study areas are drawn from Northeast, South,
Midwest, and West regions of the United States, providing opportunities for
regional comparisons.
2. Census Tract Data
For each study city, 2010 census tract boundaries were obtained from the
census TIGER/Line shapefiles database.147 Census tract attributes were obtained
via an API pull from the relevant five-year (2006–2010 or 2013–2017) American
Community Survey (ACS) datasets.148 This data includes vacancy rates (2010),149
median gross rent (2010 and 2017),150 median gross income (2010 and 2017),151

145. The R code used to perform this step is located at https://uofi.box.com/s/
kh7zalt1n1bnp7j7j1lo5g1s39fykgmu [ https://perma.cc/67HF-RKRH ].
146. A csv file containing the unique project data is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/
3006ilx5taki2ru1edxy0ptoj46078d7 [ https://perma.cc/SJ5P-YMF5 ].
147. The R code used to perform this step is located at https://uofi.box.com/s/
fnjhee3zwsklyc6z8lubua3z2mrbfk9b [ https://perma.cc/XHE3-8W79 ].
148. The R code used to perform this step is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/
dya64az31w01dypxf5r5bmj2btoj8w12 [ https://perma.cc/G2TW-Z2GW ].
149. The 2010 vacancy rate variable is listed as acs5/profile variable number DP04_0003P. See
Census Data API: Variables in /data/2010/acs/acs5/profile/variables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https:/
/api.census.gov/data/2010/acs/acs5/profile/variables.html [ https://perma.cc/5GPW-GKL7 ] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2021 ) [ hereinafter Data Profile Variables (2010) ].
150. The 2010 median gross rent variable is listed as acs5/profile variable number
B25064_001E. See Census Data API: Variables in data/2010/acs/acs5/variables, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://api.census.gov/data/2010/acs/acs5/variables.html [ https://perma.cc/97NY8ZLG ] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021 ). The 2017 median gross rent variable is listed as acs5/profile variable
number B25031_001E. See Census Data API: Variables in data/2017/acs/acs5/variables, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://api.census.gov/data/2017/acs/acs5/variables.html [ https://perma.cc/K4RLYV34 ] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021 ).
151. Both the 2010 and 2017 median gross income variables are listed as acs5/profile variable
number DP03_0086 (median family income). See Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149; Census
Data API: Variables in /data/2017/acs/acs5/profile/variables, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://
api.census.gov/data/2017/acs/acs5/profile/variables.html [ https://perma.cc/9NKY-CYWY ] ( last
visited Jan. 1, 2021 ) [ hereinafter Data Profile Variables (2017) ]. Both the 2010 and 2017 median gross
income variables are listed as acs5/profile variable number DP03_0086 (median family income). See
Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149; Data Profile Variables (2017), supra.
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percent Black population (2010),152 percent white population (2010 and 2017),153
and total households (2010).154
The eligibility status of census tracts for NMTC allocations was determined
using PolicyMap’s dataset of “New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) eligibility status,
for CY 2017 using 2006–2010 eligibility data.”155 After joining the data to the census
tract shapefiles, I extracted the subset of tracts that were eligible for NMTC
allocations.156 Limiting the sample in this way helps avoid excess zeros caused by
zero counts in ineligible census tracts.157
C. Quadrat Density Analysis
1. Methods
A quadrat density analysis was used to describe the spatial patterns of NMTC
project locations in each city in order to determine whether investment appears to
cluster in areas that exhibit signs of gentrification. To perform a quadrat density
analysis, each study area is “divided into smaller sub-regions (i.e., quadrats), and
then the point density is computed for each sub-region.”158 For each quadrat, the
point density is computed by dividing the number of points in the quadrat by the
quadrat’s area.159 In this analysis, two quadrat analyses were performed for each
study city, with quadrats defined with reference to census tract attributes.160 In the
152. The 2010 percent black population variable is listed as acs5/profile variable number
DP05_0033P. See Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149.
153. Both the 2010 and 2017 percent white population variables are listed as acs5/profile
variable number DP05_0032P. See Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149; Data Profile Variables
(2017), supra note 151.
154. The 2010 total households variable is listed as acs5/profile variable number DP02_0001E.
See Data Profile Variables (2010), supra note 149.
155. POLICY MAP, https://illinois.policymap.com/maps?i=9894665&btd=6&period=20062010&lind=111&cx=-96.68649857479217&cy=35.65445151828503&cz=2 [ https://perma.cc/XN3A
-DNU2 ] (New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) eligibility status, for CY 2017 using 2006–2010
eligibility data).
156. The R code for this step is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/
vohi3exf3tbcxgrhimylv2hmbnwxcod6 [ https://perma.cc/C4XV-D8FQ ].
157. An analysis of all census tracts would produce two types of zero counts. The first would
be counts of zero projects in tracts that were not eligible for NMTC allocations. The second would be
counts of zero projects in tracts that were eligible, but were not chosen by investors. Only the latter
category is of interest in this study, which is focused on understanding which eligible census tracts are
most likely to be selected for tax-subsidized investment. The former category is referred to as “excess
zeros,” which can skew regression results. See Peter A. Lachenbruch, Analysis of Data with Excess Zeros,
11 STAT. METHODS MED. RSCH. 297 (2002).
158. Yuan et al., supra note 112.
159. MANUEL GIMOND, INTRO TO GIS AND SPATIAL ANALYSIS ch. 11 (2021) (ebook), https:/
/mgimond.github.io/Spatial/index.html [ https://perma.cc/7R9Z-7WB9 ].
160. Traditionally, quadrats are defined by regions with equal area. J. López De La Cruz
& M.A. Gutiérrez, Spatial Statistics of Pitting Corrosion Patterning: Quadrat Counts and the
Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process, 50 CORROSION SCI. 1441 (2008). However, quadrats can also be
defined with reference to an underlying covariate, such as ranges of elevation, population size, or
income level. GIMOND, supra note 159. In such cases, the quadrats may have non-uniform shape and
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first, quadrats were defined with reference to 2010 vacancy rates. In the second,
quadrats were defined with reference to the change in median rents during the
period between the 2010 five-year ACS survey and the 2017 five-year
ACS survey.161
Each city was divided into six subregions—or quadrats—to be analyzed.
Dividing the cities into six subregions allows for a more detailed analysis of the
spatial patterns than the more traditional four-region division. The six quadrats were
defined with reference to standard deviations (denoted by the symbol σ) from the
mean value of the underlying variable. For example, Quadrats 1, 2, and 3 include
census tracts that experienced lower than average rent increases (or vacancy rates)
during the study period, while Quadrats 4, 5, and 6 include census tracts that
experienced higher than average rent increases (or vacancy rates). Table 1
summarizes the ranges included in each quadrat.
Quadrat
Range
1
-inf: -2σ from mean
2
-2σ from mean: -1σ from mean
3
-1σ from mean: mean
4
mean: +1σ from mean
5
+1σ from mean: +2σ from mean
6
+2σ from mean: inf
Table 1: Quadrat Ranges with Reference to Census Tract Percent Rent
Increase (2010–2017) or Vacancy Rate (2010)
For each city, a map of the quadrats was projected using the
NAD_1983_StatePlane coordinate system appropriate for its location.162 I then
overlayed the point locations of all NMTC projects for which addresses are
available, as described in Part II.B above. For example, figure 1 visualizes the New
York City quadrats with NMTC projects overlayed on the map.

area. Id. The R code for the quadrat analyses performed in this study are available at https://
uofi.box.com/s/z2g7nkewfodzhc9qgnyp bzl7wd4jf3un [ https://perma.cc/34N6-EZVX ].
161. Because the purpose of the quadrat analyses is to describe the locations of NMTC projects
within the fiscal geographies eligible for NMTC allocations—not within the cities as a whole—I began
by using R code to extract subsets of NMTC-eligible census tracts within city boundaries. The R code
used for this step is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/y35ejfq64dg8w4hvje0odtz3kon1nd0d
[ https://perma.cc/NTK4-GBK8 ]. This step produced twenty unique shapefiles containing the
NMTC fiscal geographies of each study city. Each file was rendered as a raster layer to ensure
compatibility with the quadratcount() function from the SPATSTAT package. Himanshu Mathur
& Stefania Bertazzon, Rasterizing Census Geography: Definition and Optimization of a Regular Grid, in
ADVANCES IN GISCIENCE 251–69 (Monica Sester, Lars Bernard & Volker Paelke eds., 2009) http://
link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-642-00318-9_13 [ https://perma.cc/3SSJ-Q36D ].
162. ArcGIS 10.1 Projected Coordinate System Tables, ESRI, https://desktop.arcgis.com/en/
arcmap/10.3/guide-books/map-projections/pdf/projected_coordinate_systems.pdf
[ https://
perma.cc/YR9C-TB2E ] ( last visited Oct. 6, 2021 ).
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Figure 1: Chicago NMTC Projects (2001–2009) Plotted on Rent Change
Quadrat Map* (Percent Change from 2010–2017†)
* Quadrats 1–6 reflect subregions of NMTC-eligible census tracts defined with
reference to census tract change in median gross rent. Areas in Quadrat 1 experienced
the lowest increase (or a decrease) in median gross rent during the study period. Areas
in Quadrat 6 experienced the highest increase in median gross rent during the study
period.
†Median Gross Rent values for 2010 and 2017 obtained from the 5-year American
Community Survey for years 2006-2010 and 2013-2017.

Finally, the quadratcount() function from the spatstat package in R was used
to generate point counts within each quadrat and compute the point density within
each quadrat. The point density counts are expressed as the number of projects per
square mile.
2. Results
The quadrat analyses describe the point density of NMTC projects, where the
results for each quadrat are expressed in terms of the number of projects per square
mile. As this subsection will explain, the results of the quadrat analysis demonstrate
that the point density of NMTC projects is often highest in eligible census tracts
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that either (a) have higher than average vacancy rates or (b) have higher than average
rent increases. Because both high vacancy rates and rent increases are known to
correlate with gentrification, these results suggest that NMTC investment has
clustered in areas that may be experiencing gentrification.
It is important to note that higher point density in a quadrat does not
necessarily correspond to higher raw numbers of projects in that quadrat. Since
point density is calculated with reference to area—and the sizes of census tracts
differ—point density is affected by the size of the quadrat subregions. In many
cases, Quadrats 1, 2, 5 and 6 had smaller areas than Quadrats 3 and 4. By way of
illustration, figure 2 and figure 3 provide a side-by-side comparison of the
Philadelphia rent change quadrat map and the project density in the same quadrats.

Figure 2: Philadelphia NMTC Projects (2001–2009) Plotted on Rent Change
Quadrat Map (Percent Change from 2010–2017†) (Q1 = Lowest; Q6 = Highest)
†Median

Gross Rent values for 2010 and 2017 obtained from the 5-year American
Community Survey for years 2006-2010 and 2013-2017.
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Figure 3: Density of Philadelphia NMTC Projects (2001–2009) (in
projects per square mile) by Rent Change Quadrat (Percent Change from
2010–2017†)
†Median

Gross Rent values for 2010 and 2017 obtained from the 5-year American
Community Survey for years 2006-2010 and 2013-2017.

Moreover, cross-city comparisons of raw point-density values may not be
meaningful due to variations in cities’ sizes and numbers of projects. However, a
comparison of trends across the sample is meaningful. As this Section will explain,
the results were highly consistent across the twenty cities in the study sample,
showing that in nearly every city, NMTC projects were disproportionately located
in (a) areas with a higher share of vacant properties relative to other eligible tracts
and (b) areas that are experiencing a higher increase in median gross rent relative to
other eligible tracts. Both of these trends provide evidence that, in many cities,
NMTC allocations have flowed to areas that exhibit at least one of two variables
predictive of gentrification: high vacancy rates and rent increases.
As Part III will explain, these results suggest that the NMTC may be an
inefficient subsidy in most cities, and it raises important questions about whether
its outcomes are equitable. However, some variations across the sample are also
notable. As this Section will explain, the quadrat analyses did yield a handful of
outliers. For example, in both Milwaukee and New York City, project density was
highest in rent change Quadrat 1, where rent increases were smallest (or, in some
cases, rental rates were declining) during the period. Possible reasons for this
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heterogeneity, and its implications for tax incentive administration, will also be
discussed in Part III. The remainder of this Subsection II.C.2 will describe the
results of the quadrat density analyses in each region.
a. Point Density and Vacancy Rates
The vacancy rate quadrat analysis showed that project density is consistently
highest in quadrats with the highest vacancy rates, suggesting that NMTC projects
are most likely to be located in areas that may be experiencing gentrification. In all
but two cities (Cleveland and Minneapolis), the density of NMTC projects was
highest in Quadrat 5 or Quadrat 6, where vacancy rates were highest. Table 2 shows
the density of NMTC projects per quadrat for each city studied. Figures 4–7 display
the results in each region using bar charts.
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Northeast

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Boston

1.499

0.668

1.018

0.094

1.500

0.916

New York

0.000

0.365

0.549

0.690

0.683

0.865

Philadelphia

0.000

0.098

0.049

0.592

0.280

1.354

Pittsburgh

0.000

0.417

0.486

0.398

2.854

0.000

Midwest

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Chicago

0.000

0.042

0.274

0.319

0.398

0.325

Cincinnati

0.000

0.000

0.140

0.291

0.612

9.195

Cleveland

0.000

0.163

1.157

0.491

0.154

0.446

Columbus

0.000

0.000

0.088

0.248

0.363

0.456

Milwaukee

0.000

0.000

0.977

1.039

2.832

2.000

Minneapolis

0.000

0.613

0.405

1.266

0.355

1.077

St. Louis

0.000

0.000

0.346

1.121

0.529

4.719

South

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Baltimore

0.000

0.062

0.095

0.753

1.066

2.272

Jackson

0.000

0.000

0.456

0.134

0.109

0.753

Louisville

0.000

0.145

0.151

0.244

2.487

1.059

New Orleans

0.366

0.297

0.013

0.009

3.529

0.112

West

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Denver

0.000

0.000

0.026

0.337

0.337

1.769

Los Angeles

0.000

0.029

0.286

0.105

0.422

0.504

Phoenix

0.000

0.144

0.148

0.077

0.582

0.757

Portland

0.000

0.042

0.650

0.756

0.047

4.002

Seattle
1.890
0.000
0.449
0.540
1.098
7.204
Table 2: NMTC Project Density (in Number of Projects Per Square Mile)
by Vacancy Rate Quadrat (percent vacancies, 2010)*
*Quadrats 1–6 reflect subregions of NMTC-eligible census tracts defined with
reference to census tract change vacancy rate (2010). Areas in Quadrat 1 had the lowest
vacancy rates as of the 2010 five-year American Community Survey, and areas in
Quadrat 6 experienced the highest vacancy rate during the same period.

Figure 4 shows that in the Northeast cities studied, the point density of NMTC
projects was highest in vacancy rate Quadrat 6 in New York, Philadelphia, and
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Pittsburgh. In other words, in these cities, the density of NMTC projects was
highest in the parts of the cities where vacancy rates were also highest. This pattern
was especially notable in the two Pennsylvania cities, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh,
suggesting that in those cities, projects tended to cluster in areas with high vacancy
rates. In contrast, in Boston, the density of NMTC projects was roughly the same
in Quadrat 1 as in Quadrat 5, and the overall point density was skewed toward areas
with lower vacancy rates.
Figure 5 shows that in the Midwest cities studied, the point density of NMTC
projects was highest in vacancy rate Quadrat 6 in Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus,
and St. Louis. The point density of NMTC was highest in Quadrat 5 in Chicago and
Milwaukee. These results describe spatial patterns in which NMTC projects appear
to cluster in the two subregions with the highest vacancy rates. This pattern is
especially notable in Cincinnati and St. Louis. Of the seven Midwest cities studied,
the only city that did not follow this pattern was Minneapolis, which had a more
even distribution of projects across quadrats.
Figure 6 shows that in the Western cities studied, the point density of NMTC
projects was highest in vacancy rate Quadrat 6 in all five cities: Denver, Los Angeles,
Phoenix, Portland, and Seattle. These results describe spatial patterns in which
NMTC projects appear to cluster in the subregion with the highest vacancy rate.
This pattern is especially notable in Portland and Seattle, where point density was
significantly higher in Quadrat 6 than in any other quadrat.
Figure 7 shows that in the Southern cities studied, the point density of NMTC
projects was highest in vacancy rate Quadrat 6 in two cities (Baltimore and Jackson)
and in Quadrat 5 in two cities (Louisville and New Orleans). These results describe
spatial patterns in which NMTC projects appear to cluster in the two subregions
with the highest vacancy rate. This pattern is especially visible in Baltimore,
Louisville, and New Orleans. In Jackson, the quadrat with the second-highest point
density was Quadrat 3, where census tract vacancy rates were within one standard
deviation below the mean.
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Figures 4-7: Density of NMTC projects (in number of projects per mile)
by vacancy rate quadrat (2010) (Q1 = Lowest; Q6 = Highest)

Figure 4: Northeast

Figure 5: Midwest
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Figure 6: West

Figure 7: South
b. Point Density and Rent Increase
In most cities, project density is also highest in quadrats with the highest
increase in gross median rent, providing further evidence that NMTC projects are
most likely to be located in areas that may be experiencing gentrification. In all but
six cities (Boston, Chicago, Louisville, Milwaukee, Phoenix and New York), the
density of NMTC projects was highest in Quadrat 5 or Quadrat 6, where rent
increases were highest. Table 3 shows the density of NMTC projects per quadrat
for each city studied. Figures 8 and 9 visualize the results for each region using bar
charts.
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Northeast

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Boston

0.000

1.246

0.977

1.242

1.103

0.000

New York

2.550

0.080

0.465

0.736

1.944

1.346

Philadelphia

0.000

0.129

0.097

0.409

0.445

1.839

Pittsburgh

0.000

0.000

0.242

1.364

1.251

1.728

Midwest

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Chicago

0.000

0.127

0.367

0.257

0.000

0.000

Cincinnati

1.019

0.199

0.076

0.341

0.518

9.865

Cleveland

0.000

0.607

0.449

0.557

0.952

2.744

Columbus

0.000

0.050

0.112

0.128

0.348

1.517

Milwaukee

3.355

1.659

1.139

0.630

1.697

2.011

Minneapolis

0.000

0.000

0.573

0.536

2.281

0.000

St. Louis

0.000

0.111

0.249

0.724

1.145

5.285

South

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Baltimore

0.000

0.000

0.347

0.838

2.031

0.000

Jackson

0.000

0.067

0.219

0.057

0.000

2.660

Louisville

0.000

0.000

0.861

0.048

0.000

0.000

New Orleans

0.176

0.206

0.006

0.177

0.660

1.911

West

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

Q6

Denver

0.264

0.092

0.191

0.155

0.575

0.645

Los Angeles

0.000

0.000

0.042

0.240

0.523

0.359

Phoenix

0.000

0.115

0.220

2.951

0.000

0.000

Portland

0.000

0.597

0.117

0.266

4.912

7.646

Seattle
0.000
0.111
0.249
0.724
1.145
5.285
Table 3: NMTC Project Density (in Number of Projects Per Square Mile)
by Rent Change Quadrat (percent change, 2010–2017)*
*Quadrats 1–6 reflect subregions of NMTC-eligible census tracts defined with
reference to census tract change in gross median income (2010–2017). Areas in
Quadrat 1 had the lowest increase in gross median rent (or a decrease in gross median
rent) during the period between the 2010 five-year American Community Survey
(2006–2010 average values) and the 2017 five-year American Community Survey
(2013–2017 average values), and areas in Quadrat 6 experienced the highest increases
in gross median rent during the same period.
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Figure 8 shows that in the Northeast cities studied, the point density of NMTC
projects was highest in rent change rate Quadrat 6 in both Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh. In these cities, the point density was highest where rent increases were
also highest. In contrast, in Boston and New York, point density was highest in
Quadrat 2 and Quadrat 1, respectively. In these cities, point density was highest in
parts of the cities where rents were increasing most slowly (or, in some cases,
declining). However, it is worth noting that in Boston, the NMTCs were relatively
evenly distributed across rent change Quadrats 2–5, and in New York, the second
and third highest point densities were found in Quadrats 5 and 6. These patterns
suggest that projects are not clustered in the lowest quadrats of either city.
Figure 9 shows that in the Midwest cities studied, the point density of NMTC
projects was highest in rent change rate Quadrat 6 in Cincinnati, Cleveland,
Columbus, and St. Louis. Point density was highest in rent change Quadrat 5 in
Minneapolis. In each of these cities, the spatial patterns suggest that projects cluster
in areas where rent is increasing. In contrast, in Chicago, no projects were located
in either of Quadrats 5 or 6, and point density was highest in Quadrat 3. This
suggests that projects do not cluster in areas where rent is increasing in Chicago. In
Milwaukee, point density was highest in Quadrat 1, but it was second highest in
Quadrat 6, and no clear pattern is evident.
Figure 10 shows that in the Southern cities studied, the point density of
NMTC projects was highest in rent change rate Quadrat 6 in Jackson and New
Orleans. Point density was highest in rent change Quadrat 5 in Baltimore. In each
of these cities, the NMTC investment has clustered in areas where rent is increasing.
In Louisville, no projects were located in either of Quadrats 5 or 6. In that city,
point density was highest in Quadrat 3, where the rate of rent increase was within
one standard deviation below the mean. This suggests that projects do not cluster
in areas where rent is increasing in Louisville.
Figure 11 shows that in the Western cities studied, the point density of NMTC
projects was highest in rent change rate Quadrat 6 in Denver, Portland, and Seattle.
Point density was highest in rent change Quadrat 5 in Los Angeles. In Phoenix, no
projects were located in Quadrats 5 or 6. However, the point density in Phoenix
was significantly higher in Quadrat 4, where rent increases were within one standard
deviation above the mean, than in any of the lower quadrats. This suggests that
projects did cluster in parts of the city with higher-than-average rent increases but
not in areas with the highest rent increases during the period.
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Figures 8-11: Density of NMTC projects (in number of projects per
mile) by rent change rate quadrat (2010–2017) (Q1 = Lowest; Q6 = Highest)

Figure 8: Northeast

Figure 9: Midwest
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Figure 10: South

Figure 11: West
D. Negative Binomial Regression Analysis
1. Model
The quadrat density analyses above are useful to describe relative point
distributions across subregions, but they may not provide a reliable indication of
how they relate to the explanatory variables studied. For example, it can tell us that
in Philadelphia, NMTC projects appear to be clustered in parts of the city where
rent is increasing the most. However, it cannot tell us how much the count of NMTC
projects increases as a function of increasing rent. For this, a negative binomial
regression analysis was used to model the relationship between project frequency
and the vacancy rate and rent change variables. This analysis describes the strength
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of the relationship between project frequency and key indicators of gentrification,
including vacancy rates and rent increases. Specifically, the results of the analyses
provide information about how much the observed count of projects has increased
with each unit change in vacancy rate or rent increase.
Count data, like the project count data analyzed in this study, is often modeled
using the Poisson point process model.163 In its most fundamental form, the
Poisson point process describes a random benchmark against which point patterns,
such as the count of items within a given area, can be compared.164 Specifically, a
Poisson distribution assumes that the probability of an observed outcome (e.g., the
count of NMTC allocations in a census tract) can be expressed as follows:

Prob(Yi = yi|xi) =

!

"#! "!
#!
%! !

(1)

where “Yi is the random variable representing a count, yi is a particular count value
(e.g., 3), 𝜆𝜆! is the sole parameter representing the expected value of the count, and
i = 1, 2, . . . N indexes the N cases.”165
The Poisson point process has been used to develop various models to define
point patterns, including a model to describe “changes in point density as a function
of a covariate.”166 For example, the Poisson process model has been used to model
the frequency of gun violence relative to segregation and poverty rates.167 Here, a
version of the Poisson point process model can be used to describe how frequently
NMTC projects occur in census tracts with attributes associated with gentrification
(e.g., vacancy rate, rent change). When, as here, the objective is to capture
“systematic variation in 𝜆𝜆! , the value of 𝜆𝜆! is most commonly placed within a
loglinear model.”168 The basic model has been expressed as follows169:

𝛽𝛽 𝑥𝑥
ln(𝜆𝜆) = ∑'
()* 𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘

(2)

163. Andreas Lindén & Samu Mäntyniemi, Using the Negative Binomial Distribution to Model
Overdispersion in Ecological Count Data, 92 ECOLOGY 1414 (2011).
164. López De La Cruz & Gutiérrez, supra note 160.
165. Richard Berk & John M. MacDonald, Overdispersion and Poisson Regression, 24
J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 269, 277 (2008).
166. GIMOND, supra note 159.
167. See David A. Larsen, Sandra Lane, Timothy Jennings-Bey, Arnett Haygood-El, Kim
Brundage & Robert A. Rubinstein, Spatio-Temporal Patterns of Gun Violence in Syracuse, New York
2009-2015, PLOS ONE (Mar 20, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0173001
[ https://perma.cc/EZ6H-ZDD5 ].
168. Berk & MacDonald, supra note 165. A traditional linear regression is disfavored for
modeling counts since count values cannot drop below zero, but linear models often predict
negative values.
169. Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Adam Carlis, Race and Selective Enforcement in Public
Housing, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 708 (2012).
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where ln(𝜆𝜆) is the natural logarithm of the expected count of NMTC projects in a
given location. This value, which is sometimes referred to as “point intensity,”170 is
expressed relative to “a vector of explanatory variables, xk and their associated
regression coefficients, 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘.”171 The equation describes a point pattern as a loglinear
function of the underlying covariates, whereby “intensity is exponentially increasing
or decreasing as a function of the covariate.”172
However, the NMTC data used for this study does not meet a key assumption
of the general Poisson point process model, which requires that “the residual
variance be equal to the fitted values, 𝜆𝜆.”173 A preliminary analysis of the sample
data showed that, in most cities, the residual variance significantly exceeds the mean.
This result, which is referred to as “overdispersion,” violates the assumption
required by the Poisson process model.174 Overdispersion is likely when there are
potentially important variables that are not captured by the model or when error
exists in the estimates of variables that are considered.175 In this case, there are
variables that would be nearly impossible to capture, such as variations in nontax
legal frameworks or political dynamics that may affect investment decisions.
For this reason, this analysis employs a common method for addressing
overdispersion, which is “to specify that the probability of the observed outcome,
y, follows a negative binomial distribution.”176 The resulting model is a negative
binomial regression model, which has been shown to fit data better than other
models when counts are infrequent, as they are in the case of NMTC allocations.
The resulting model is a negative binomial regression model, which has been shown
to fit data better than other models when counts are infrequent, as they are in the
case of NMTC allocations.177 The negative binomial regression is a version of the
Poisson process model that includes the negative binomial distribution parameter.
The negative binomial distribution has been expressed as:

Probability(Y = y| 𝜆𝜆, 𝛼𝛼) =

+(%-. #$ )
%!+(. #$ )

. #$

-.#$ - #.

. #$

-

.

#

.
#$ - #

%

(3)

where “Γ is the gamma function, 𝜆𝜆 is the mean or expected value of the distribution,
and 𝛼𝛼 is the overdispersion parameter.”178
170. GIMOND, supra note 159.
171. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708.
172. GIMOND, supra note 159.
173. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708.
174. Id.
175. Haibin Liu, Rachel A. Davidson, David V. Rosowsky & Jery R. Stedinger, Negative
Binomial Regression of Electric Power Outages in Hurricanes, 11 J. INFRASTRUCTURE SYS. 258, 262 (2005).
176. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708.
177. See Kevin M. Swartout, Martie P. Thompson, Mary P. Koss & Nan Su, What Is the Best
Way to Analyze Less Frequent Forms of Violence? The Case of Sexual Aggression, 5 PSYCH. VIOLENCE
305 (2015).
178. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708.
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In addition, variability in census tract population is accounted for through use
of an exposure variable, or offset, that reflects the number of households per census
tract. Use of the exposure variable enables an analysis of rates instead of counts.179
To this end, equation (2) is modified by adding n to the denominator
#

𝛽𝛽 𝑥𝑥
ln / 0 = ∑'
()* 𝑘𝑘 𝑘𝑘
0

(4)

where “the exposure variable, ln(n), is assigned a fixed coefficient of 1, and the
negative binomial regression is transformed into an analysis of rates.”180 In this case,
the exposure variable is the natural logarithm of the number of households per
census tracts.
I use the spatstat package in R to fit the negative binomial regression model
to the data.181 In addition to the two variables of interest—census tract vacancy
rates (2010) and the percent change in gross median rent (2010–2017)—the model
includes four additional variables that may influence NMTC project citing patterns.
The additional variables include census tract median gross income (2010), census
tract Black population (2010), the change in census tract white population
(2010–2017), and the change in census tract median gross income (2010–2017).
These variables are potentially relevant since resident demographics may constitute
alternate drivers for investment decisions in addition to the economic variables
studied here. The purpose of this analysis is to produce regression estimates of the
relative strength of vacancy rates and rent change, controlling for possible effects
of race and income.
2. Results
As this Subsection will explain, the negative binomial regression analysis
provides further evidence that vacancy rates and rent change are predictive of
NMTC allocation patterns in many cities. In over half of the cities studied (thirteen
of twenty), vacancy rate or rent change was the largest statistically significant
predictor of NMTC allocations. Rent change was the strongest statistically
significant predictor in seven cities: Cleveland, Columbus, Jackson, New Orleans,
New York, Philadelphia, and Phoenix. Vacancy rate was the strongest statistically
significant predictor in six cities: Baltimore, Cincinnati, Denver, Los Angeles,
Louisville, and St. Louis.
In negative binomial regressions, as in general Poisson point process models,
coefficients reflect the amount by which the logs of expected project counts are
expected to change with every unit change in the explanatory variable.182 For this
179. Fagan et al., supra note 169, at 708.
180. Id. at 709 (emphasis omitted).
181. The R code for this step is available at https://uofi.box.com/s/gp6ndv02rw2f9rrf2idd
66tnh2o0n9su [ https://perma.cc/B4A5-GDLH ].
182. Poisson Regression, Stata Annotated Output, UCLA INST. DIGIT. RSCH. & EDUC., https:/
/stats.idre.ucla.edu/stata/output/poisson-regression/#:~:text=We%20can%20interpret%20the%20
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reason, coefficients are typically interpreted by exponentiating the values, where
(exp(b) – 1)*100 = percent change in count per unit change in the explanatory
variable.183 For example, the rent change coefficient for New York City (b = 1.764)
is interpreted as stating that, controlling for the other explanatory variables in the
model, for every unit change in rent increase, the percent of NMTC allocations
increases by (e1.764 – 1)*100 = (5.836 – 1)*100 = 483.57%. This means that, in New
York City, the density of NMTC allocations is exponentially increasing as a function
of rent change. Tables 4–7 report the results of the negative binomial regression
analysis for each region.

Poisson,the%20model%20are%20held%20constant [ https://perma.cc/JZ7C-4DRP ] ( last visited
Oct. 6, 2021 ).
183. Hao Wang, Interpret Poisson Regression Coefficient, HAO WANG, http://haowang.pw/
blog/Poisson-Coefficient-Interpretation/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2021) [ https://perma.cc/TRT2-4FW5 ];
PAUL ROBACK & JULIE LEGLER, BEYOND MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION: APPLIED
GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS AND MULTILEVEL MODELS IN R ch. 4 ( 2021) (ebook), https://
bookdown.org/roback/bookdown-bysh/ch-poissonreg.html [ https://perma.cc/D9VD-UDN7 ].
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Boston
b
-0.791
0.037
<0.001
-0.002
0.043

Variable
Rent Change
Vacancy Rate
Median Gross Income
Black Population
White Population
Change
Median Income
<0.001
Change
Chi-Square Test
0.901
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

[Vol. 12:163

SE
0.756
0.034
<0.001
0.007
0.023

Northeast
New York
p
b
SE
1.764
0.505
0.063
0.020
<0.001 <0.001
0.005
0.005
*
-0.005 0.012

<0.001

*

<0.001

p
***
***
**

<0.001

1

Northeast (continued)
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Variable
b
SE
p
b
SE
Rent Change
3.025
0.970
***
1.598
1.033
Vacancy Rate
0.041
0.029
0.040
0.030
Median Gross Income
<0.001 <0.001
<0.001 <0.001
Black Population
-0.003 0.007
0.001
0.010
White Population Change 0.028
0.024
0.037
0.029
Median Income Change
<0.001 <0.001
<0.001 <0.001
Chi-Square Test
1
0.996
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Table 4: Negative Binomial Regression of NMTC Allocations in
Northeast Cities by Census Tract Rent Change (2010–2017), Vacancy
Rate (2010), Median Gross Income (2010), Black Population (2010),
White Population Change (2010–2017), and Median Gross Income
Change (2010–2017)
Table 4 shows that in the Northeast cities, rent increase was the strongest
statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two of the four cities, New
York and Philadelphia. In New York, high vacancy rates were also a statistically
significant predictor of NMTC projects. These results are consistent with the results
of the quadrat density analysis, and they provide further evidence that NMTC
investment in the Northeast has occurred in areas that exhibit signs of
gentrification. However, in Boston, where the spatial patterns reflected in the
quadrat analyses were less conclusive, the regression analysis showed no statistically
significant relationships between project counts and rent change or vacancy rates.
In that city, demographic characteristics were stronger predictors. Finally, no
statistically significant predictors were observed in Pittsburgh. Reasons for this
variation will be considered in Part III below.

p
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Chicago
Variable
b
Rent Change
-0.715
Vacancy Rate
0.031
Median Gross Income
<0.001
Black Population
0.001
White Population Change
-0.004
Median Income Change
<0.001
Chi-Square Test
1
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

SE
0.843
0.020
<0.001
0.005
0.017
<0.001

205

Midwest
Cincinnati
p
b
SE
0.133
1.199
0.084
0.022
*
<0.001 <0.001
-0.010 0.011
0.030
0.024
<0.001 <0.001
0.988

Midwest (continued)
Cleveland
Columbus
Variable
b
SE
p
b
SE
Rent Change
2.133
1.065
**
1.471
0.770
Vacancy Rate
-0.008 0.026
0.071
0.021
Median Gross Income
<0.001 <0.001
<0.001 <0.001
Black Population
<0.001 0.007
0.007
0.010
White Population Change
0.006
0.026
0.073
0.029
Median Income Change
<0.001 <0.001
<0.001 <0.001
Chi-Square Test
0.993
1
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Midwest (continued)
Minneapolis
St. Louis
Variable
b
SE
p
b
Rent Change
0.856
1.556
0.102
Vacancy Rate
0.030
0.040
0.035
Median Gross Income
<0.001 <0.001
<0.001
Black Population
0.024
0.019
0.008
White Population Change
-0.005 0.028
-0.037
Median Income Change
<0.001 <0.001
<0.001
Chi-Square Test
0.653
0.220
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Explanatory
Variable
Rent Change
Vacancy Rate
Median Gross Income
Black Population

Midwest (continued)
Milwaukee
b
SE
p
0.049
0.026
<0.001
-0.006

1.766
0.032
<0.001
0.007

SE
0.927
0.019
<0.001
0.008
0.025
<0.001

p
***

p
*
***
**
***

p
*

***
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White Population Change
0.004
Median Income Change
<0.001
Chi-Square Test
0.869
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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0.024
<0.001

Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression of NMTC Allocations in Midwest
Cities by Census Tract Rent Change (2010–2017), Vacancy Rate (2010),
Median Gross Income (2010), Black Population (2010), White Population
Change (2010–2017), and Median Gross Income Change (2010–2017)
Table 5 shows that in the Midwest cities, rent increase was the strongest
statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two of the seven cities,
Cleveland and Columbus, both of which are located in Ohio. In addition, vacancy
rates were the strongest statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two
cities, Cincinnati and St. Louis. These results are consistent with the patterns
observed in the quadrat density analysis, and they provide further evidence that in
many Midwest cities, NMTC investment has flowed to areas that exhibit signs of
gentrification. However, in the remaining three cities—Chicago, Minneapolis, and
Milwaukee—no variable was a strong, statistically significant predictor of NMTC
project counts. Reasons for this variation will be explored in Part III.
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Baltimore
Variable
b
SE
Rent Change
-0.046 0.564
Vacancy Rate
0.085
0.018
Median Gross Income
<0.001 <0.001
Black Population
-0.020 0.008
White Population Change
0.043
0.024
Median Income Change
<0.001 <0.001
Chi-Square Test
1
***p<0.01; **p<0.05, *p<0.1

New Orleans
Variable
b
SE
Rent Change
1.304
0.658
Vacancy Rate
0.039
0.020
Median Gross Income
<0.001 <0.001
Black Population
0.003
0.010
White Population Change
0.022
0.019
Median Income Change
<0.001 <0.001
Chi-Square Test
0.451
***p<0.01; **p<0.05, *p<0.1

South
p
***
**
*

207
Louisville
b
SE
-2.242 1.980
0.104
0.052
<0.001 <0.001
-0.020 0.016
0.030
0.046
<0.001 <0.001
0.974

South (continued)
Jackson
p
b
**
5.728
*
0.083
<0.001
-0.003
0.032
<0.001
0.241

SE
2.658
0.055
<0.001
0.030
0.077
<0.001

Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression of NMTC Allocations in
Southern Cities by Census Tract Rent Change (2010–2017), Vacancy Rate
(2010), Median Gross Income (2010), Black Population (2010), White
Population Change (2010–2017), and Median Gross Income Change
(2010–2017)
Table 6 shows that in the four Southern cities studied, rent increase was the
strongest statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two cities, New
Orleans and Jackson. In the other two cities, Baltimore and Louisville, vacancy rate
was the strongest statistically significant predictor. These results are consistent with
the patterns observed in the quadrat density analysis, and they provide further
evidence that in the South, NMTC investment has flowed to areas that exhibit signs
of gentrification.

p
**

p
**
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Denver
Variable
b
Rent Change
1.230
Vacancy Rate
0.171
Median Gross Income
<0.001
Black Population
-0.019
White Population Change
0.031
Median Income Change
<0.001
Chi-Square Test
1
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Phoenix
Variable
b
Rent Change
2.220
Vacancy Rate
0.078
Median Gross Income
<0.001
Black Population
0.038
White Population Change -0.022
Median Income Change
<0.001
Chi-Square Test
0.993
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Seattle
Variable
b
Rent Change
1.681
Vacancy Rate
0.035
Median Gross Income
<0.001
Black Population
0.005
White Population Change 0.016
Median Income Change
<0.001
Chi-Square Test
0.004
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

[Vol. 12:163
West

SE
1.054
0.046
<0.001
0.016
0.016
<0.001

p
***
**

Los Angeles
b
SE
-0.097 0.582
0.056
0.032
<0.001 <0.001
0.007
0.008
-0.007 0.010
<0.001 <0.001
1

West (continued)
Portland
SE
p
b
0.803
***
0.695
0.032
**
0.061
<0.001
<0.001
0.030
0.117
0.017
-0.059
<0.001
<0.001
0.604

SE
1.103
0.050
<0.001
0.035
0.034
<0.001

West (continued)
SE
1.051
0.065
<0.001
0.035
0.039
<0.001

p

Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression of NMTC Allocations in Western
Cities by Census Tract Rent Change (2010–2017), Vacancy Rate (2010),
Median Gross Income (2010), Black Population (2010), White Population
Change (2010–2017), and Median Gross Income Change (2010–2017)
Table 7 shows that in the five Western cities studied, vacancy rates were the
strongest statistically significant predictor of NMTC projects in two cities, Denver

p
*

p

***
*
***
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and Los Angeles. In a third city, Phoenix, rent change was the strongest statistically
significant predictor. These results, which are consistent with the quadrat density
analyses, provide further evidence that in many Western cities, NMTC investment
has flowed to areas that exhibit signs of gentrification. However, in two Northwest
cities, Portland and Seattle, neither vacancy rates nor rent increase were statistically
significant predictors of NMTC projects. In Portland, higher Black populations
were predictive of NMTC investment. No variable was a statistically significant
predictor of NMTC investment in Seattle. The implications of this cross-city
variation will be explored in Part III.
Notably, the demographic variables studied (median gross income, Black
population, white population change, and change in median gross income) were not
significantly correlated to increasing NMTC project density in most cities. With the
exception of Baltimore and Portland, where the percentage of Black residents had
a small but statistically significant positive correlation with project density, the
percentage of Black residents was not a significant predictor of NMTC projects.
This result may reflect the fact that eligible census tracts have relatively similar racial
demographics, particularly in segregated cities.
In addition, the change in white population was not a statistically significant
variable in fifteen of the twenty cities studied. The exceptions included four
cities—Boston, Baltimore, Columbus, and Denver—where an increase in white
population was a statistically significant predictor of NMTC allocations.184 In
contrast, in one city—Portland—project counts had a statistically significant
negative correlation with change in white population, suggesting that the frequency
of NMTC allocations declined as white population increased. In that city, the
strongest statistically significant predictor of allocations was the 2010
Black population.
Though these findings may appear to contradict this Article’s conclusions that
NMTC project allocations have flowed to areas that exhibit signs of gentrification,
it is worth noting that demographic change is often excluded from gentrification
models since it is an unreliable indicator of the gentrification process.185 Hammel
and Wyly note that “changes in racial composition do not appear to be applicable
for the majority of gentrified neighborhoods” and “racial change is not an essential
feature of the gentrification process.”186
Perhaps more surprisingly, neither 2010 median gross income nor the change
in median gross income from 2010–2017 appears to play a meaningful role in
NMTC allocation patterns. Once again, at first blush, this result appears
inconsistent with the larger prediction that NMTC allocations may cluster in areas
184. In Boston, the increase in white population was a stronger predictor of NMTC allocations
in Boston than either vacancy rates or rent change. In Baltimore, Columbus, and Denver, where vacancy
rates and/or rent change were significant predictors, an increase in white population was also a
significant predictor of NMTC allocations.
185. See, e.g., Hammel & Wyly, supra note 32, at 256.
186. Id.
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experiencing gentrification. However, it is also possible that relevant changes in
income are not captured in the sample due to the time period studied. Another
possibility is that market conditions, such as the availability of undervalued vacant
properties, are more salient and relevant to investment decisions than
demographic characteristics.
III. TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This study provides evidence that, in many cities, federal NMTC subsidies
have flowed disproportionately to eligible census tracts that exhibit signs of
gentrification: high vacancy rates and increasing rent. The quadrat density analysis
revealed that, in most cities, NMTC project density was highest in parts of the city
that had high vacancy rates, increasing rents, or both. The results of the negative
binomial regression analysis confirmed that, in many cities, high vacancy rates or
rent increases were statistically significant predictors of NMTC investment.
Together, these results provide new evidence that gentrifying census tracts may
draw tax-subsidized investment away from other eligible areas.
These findings have important implications for the federal NMTC program,
which was recently expanded by the Consolidated Appropriations Act to authorize
five billion dollars of tax credit allocations per year from 2020 to 2025.187 As this
Section will explain, the finding that NMTC investment has flowed to areas that
exhibit signs of gentrification suggests that the law may be operating inefficiently
in many cities. In addition, these findings suggest that the law may produce
inequitable outcomes despite its stated purpose to benefit low-income
communities. Finally, the findings raise important questions about how the federal
tax incentive is administered.
Furthermore, these efficiency, equity, and administration implications are not
limited to the NMTC program. First, the critiques raised here are also relevant to
state-level NMTC programs, most of which use the federal NMTC as a model for
similar tax credit programs administered at the state level. In other words, if the
federal NMTC incentive is inefficient, inequitable, and poorly administered, many
state-level NMTC programs will suffer from the same problems. Second, these
findings are relevant to predict and evaluate the new Opportunity Zones law. As
explained above, gentrifying census tracts are among the designated opportunity
zones in many cities. Critics fear that those gentrifying tracts will draw investment
away from other eligible census tracts, and this study provides evidence to support
that prediction.
Before discussing the implications, two points are worth noting. First, this
study’s findings are somewhat surprising in the context of the NMTC, which
includes safeguards that one might expect to reduce the frequency of investment in
gentrifying areas. Other place-based tax incentives, including the Opportunity
187. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, H.R. 133, 116th Cong. § 112 (2020);
I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(H).
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Zones law, lack such safeguards and include incentives that may make investment
in gentrifying areas particularly attractive. All place-based tax incentives should be
examined and, if necessary, reformed to ensure that they contain features to reduce
the likelihood that the subsidies will flow to gentrifying areas. Failure to do so may
have devastating consequences for low-income communities given the large size of
the program.
Second, this study’s findings suggest that resident demographics do not
consistently predict NMTC investment patterns, even as other indicators of
gentrification—high vacancy rates and rent increases—do predict NMTC
investment. This is an important finding because it suggests that a myopic focus on
race and income demographics as criteria to evaluate tax incentive investment
patterns may be misplaced. When assessing outcomes of place-based tax incentives,
researchers and policymakers should pay close attention to economic indicators of
gentrification, such as those used in this study. Failure to do so may produce overly
optimistic evaluations of tax incentive programs that are, in fact, inefficiently and
inequitably flowing to gentrifying areas.
With these two big-picture points in mind, this Part begins by explaining the
efficiency, equity, and administrative implications of this study for federal and state
NMTC programs. Next, it explores the further implications of this study for the
Opportunity Zones program and other place-based tax incentive programs.
A. Implications for the New Markets Tax Credit
This study has provided evidence that NMTC investors have chosen to invest
in locations that exhibit signs of gentrification. As this Section will explain, these
findings have important efficiency, equity, and administrative implications for the
NMTC. First, these findings suggest that NMTC inefficiently subsidizes
inframarginal investment and that it inefficiently subsidizes investment in areas
where investment is already taking place. Second, these findings suggest that the
NMTC may reduce vertical equity within the tax system without increasing equitable
outcomes outside the tax system. Third, these findings suggest that the CDFI Fund,
which administers the NMTC program, has failed to consistently direct allocations
to the most distressed neighborhoods.
1. Efficiency of the NMTC
This study’s findings suggest that the NMTC may be an inefficient subsidy in
at least two respects. First, disproportionate investment in gentrifying areas may
reflect investment decisions driven by market conditions and profit potential. While
public investment almost certainly plays a role in initiating and accelerating
gentrification,188 many gentrifying investments are market driven.189 When capital
begins to flow to places with high profit potential—a precondition for
188.
189.

See Zuk et al., supra note 23.
Smith, supra note 117.
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gentrification190—economies-of-scale and agglomeration economies may generate
an additional “locational dynamic in which new production tends to be drawn to
existing production locations.”191 In other words, market dynamics in gentrifying
areas may be attractive to investors even without tax subsidies.
Accordingly, the spatial patterns described in this Article may reflect
investments driven primarily by market conditions. If this explanation is correct,
this would suggest that a meaningful amount of federal NMTC program costs
subsidize inframarginal investment that would have occurred without the
incentive.192 The purpose of place-based tax incentives like the NMTC is to
promote investment in places where it would not have occurred without
a subsidy.193
Subsidizing activity that would have occurred without the incentive is
inefficient and contrary to sound tax policy at both federal and state levels.194 When
a tax incentive “rewards a producer for production in which he would have engaged
anyway . . . the government has acted inefficiently by giving up revenue without
inducing more activity.”195 In the context of the NMTC, such inefficiencies are not
limited to the federal law. Thirteen state governments supplement the federal
incentive with state-level NMTC programs, and two states (California and
Minnesota) have proposed NMTC legislation.196 Under some state NMTC laws,
Community Development Entities (CDEs) are eligible for the tax credits only after
entering into an allocation agreement with the CDFI Fund.197 As a result, federal
NMTC allocations that subsidize inframarginal investment may have the
downstream effect of introducing inefficiencies to state-level incentive programs.
Second, these findings suggest that the NMTC is inefficient because it fails to
target places that are likely to produce the greatest public benefit. Place-based tax
incentives like the NMTC can be justified as policies that improve places for the
benefit of low-income residents.198 However, if a place is already in the process of
improving, then a public subsidy is not necessary. The NMTC statute refers to
equity investments for “targeted populations” within “low-income
communities,”199 but not all low-income neighborhoods have equal need for
place-based subsidies.
Id.
DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM: A THEORY OF UNEVEN
GEOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENT (2006).
192. See Zuk et al., supra note 23.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64
TEX. L. REV. 973, 992 (1985).
196. State NMTC Programs, supra note 29.
197. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 663/5 (2008) (defining “qualified community
development entity”).
198. See generally Layser, supra note 43 (explaining that ideally, place-based tax incentives would
improve places for the benefit of residents who live there).
199. I.R.C. § 45D(e)(2).
190.
191.
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Gentrifying neighborhoods do not need public subsidies because they are
already in transition. Therefore, to the extent that NMTC subsidies have
disproportionately benefited gentrifying neighborhoods, the law has failed to
promote neighborhood improvements that are not otherwise taking place. This
problem is distinct from the question of whether a particular project would have
proceeded but for the subsidy. Even marginal investment may be wasteful if there
is no justification for subsidizing new investment in a particular place.
A more efficient law would narrowly target neighborhoods with a specific
need for place-based investment. The appropriate target for place-based investment
depends on the specific objective of the law.200 However, at a minimum, the
geographic scope of a development incentive should exclude places that are already
in the process of gentrification. To be sure, this guideline presents challenges for
lawmakers, particularly on the federal level.
Defining and identifying gentrifying areas has long eluded academics. The
difficulty “stems not only from the complexity of the process, but also from the
difficulty of observing and measuring the phenomenon.”201 For this reason, many
scholars “eschew census data in favor of intensive field surveys or other qualitative
methods to document inner-city reinvestment.”202 However, on the federal level,
field studies are not a practical basis for legislating the geographic scope of
an incentive.
Nevertheless, census data can be used as an imperfect proxy. For example, a
statute may exclude census tracts where rent is increasing more quickly than the city
average. In the case of tax incentives like the NMTC, which are administered
through a competitive application process, the application procedures may include
an inquiry into the income and rent trajectory of proposed project sites. Proposals
for projects in neighborhoods that exhibit signs of gentrification should be rejected.
Such procedures would reduce the likelihood that the tax incentives subsidize
investments in neighborhoods that do not need them.
2. Equity Impact of the NMTC
The fact that the NMTC has disproportionately flowed to gentrifying
neighborhoods also suggests that the NMTC may have inequitable outcomes. As
this section will explain, the inequity derives from two sources. First, the NMTC
violates vertical equity principles by providing tax preferences to high-income
taxpayers, thereby undermining progressivity within the tax system. Second, the
incentive probably does not deliver sufficient nontax benefits to low-income
taxpayers to offset the “cost” of lost vertical equity within the tax system.
Tax incentives like the NMTC reduce vertical equity by lowering the tax
burden on high-income taxpayers without providing comparable relief to
200.
201.
202.

Layser, supra note 18.
Hammel & Wyly, supra note 32, at 248.
Id.
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lower-income taxpayers. In tax theory, vertical equity is the principle that tax
burdens should be distributed according to their ability to pay.203 In other words, to
maintain vertical equity, higher-income taxpayers must pay more in taxes than
lower-income taxpayers. Place-based incentives like the NMTC provide tax relief to
high-income taxpayers—individuals or institutional—in order to induce them to
direct their own capital toward redevelopment efforts. For this reason, place-based
tax incentives like the NMTC apparently violate the vertical equity principle.204
However, what is lost in vertical equity within the tax system may be justified
if these tax laws advance economic and social equity outside the tax system. One
early commenter stated that Congress intended each party of an NMTC transaction
to serve “as a mere conduit to the delivery of equity capital to existing low-income
community residents.”205 To the extent that the taxpayers who claim the tax credits
on their tax returns do, in fact, serve as mere conduits to pass benefits along to
low-income residents, the incidence of the tax benefit may fall on low-income
taxpayers. Incidence refers to the person or persons who are “actually made better
off on account of the tax provision.”206 If the incidence of the NMTC falls entirely
on low-income taxpayers, then a distributional analysis focused on who claims the
benefit on their tax returns will be misleading.207
There is no theoretical or practical reason to think that all of the benefits of
the NMTC program should flow to low-income residents. Rather, there is strong
evidence that industry participants capture a share of the benefits.208 Indeed,
without a real economic benefit to these parties, there would be little reason for
them to participate in NMTC transactions, and the entire incentive program would
fail. An open question is how much benefit do low-income residents derive from the
NMTC program, and does it outweigh the loss of vertical equity? If the answer is
“not much,” then the incentives may be mere “giveaways to rent-seeking special
interests and bad federal policy.”209
While this study cannot answer the question of how much the NMTC benefits
low-income residents, it does provide evidence that the subsidy flows to
communities that are experiencing gentrification. This raises at least two
equity-related questions. The first is whether low-income residents benefit from the
gentrification process—a topic of much debate in the literature. If low-income
residents do not benefit from the gentrification process (or worse, if they are
harmed by it) then tax incentives that disproportionately flow to gentrifying
203. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19
U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952).
204. Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1996).
205. Groves, supra note 73, at 221.
206. Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 19
(2011).
207. Id.
208. Michael Eickhoff & Steve Carter, Accessing Capital Through the New Markets Tax Credit
Program, J. STATE TAX’N, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 17.
209. Sugin, supra note 206, at 6.
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neighborhoods may produce inequitable outcomes, particularly if they contribute to
or accelerate the gentrification process.
It is possible that gentrification provides economic, political, and social
benefits to low-income residents.210 Such benefits may include “expanding
employment opportunities,” improved “shopping for low-income people,” the
creation of “an urban political fora in which affluent and poor citizens must deal
with each other’s priorities in a democratic process,” and reduced social isolation of
low-income African Americans.211 If true, then tax incentives that contribute to the
gentrification process may advance economic, socioeconomic, and racial equality.
These equality gains outside the tax system would potentially justify the loss in
vertical tax equity.
However, it is also possible that these benefits to low-income residents who
remain in gentrifying neighborhoods may be outweighed by harm to those who are
displaced. Gentrification research is inconclusive as to whether the gentrification
process results in widespread displacement.212 On the one hand, the research
“consistently shows that rent appreciation predicts displacement” and that
“out-movers are more likely to be renters, poorer, and people of color than
in-movers.”213 On the other hand, researchers have also found that “[a]lthough
displacement was significantly related to gentrification, the substantive size of this
relationship is very small” and “poor renters do not appear to be especially
susceptible to displacement.”214
In fact, the apparent stability of gentrifying neighborhoods may be
independent evidence that low-income residents do benefit from neighborhood
improvement. As mentioned previously, some researchers have proposed that the
unexpected stability may reflect the fact that “the normal neighborhood turnover
process slows in neighborhood that are gaining new amenities.”215 Others have
echoed this hypothesis, stating that “[t]he most plausible explanation for this
surprising finding is that gentrification brings with it neighborhood improvements
that are valued by disadvantaged households, and they consequently make greater
efforts to remain in their dwelling units, even if the proportion of their income
devoted to rent rises.”216
On the other hand, the inconclusive evidence of displacement may simply
reflect methodological challenges associated with gentrification research.
Researchers have long noted that tracking displacement is “a massive undertaking
210. J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405 (2003).
211. Id. at 419–22. Byrne’s essay and others like it drew sharp criticism from scholars who
objected to a general turn in the gentrification literature that downplayed the potential for gentrification
to harm low-income residents through displacement. See also Tom Slater, The Eviction of Critical
Perspectives from Gentrification Research, 30 INT’L J. URB. REG’L RSCH. 737 (2006).
212. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 37.
213. Id.
214. Freeman, supra note 30, at 480.
215. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 37.
216. Freeman & Braconi, supra note 131, at 51.
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. . . if indeed it [is] possible at all.”217 Others have echoed this sentiment, observing
that “it is difficult to find people who have been displaced, particularly if those
people are poor.”218 Compounding this problem, “quantitative analyses have
systematically failed to characterize the various stages of gentrification,” thereby
leaving out “the potential for gentrification-related displacement to precede
gentrification, especially when property owners attempt to vacate units in
anticipation of rising rents and neighborhood change.”219
Given the uncertainty, it is difficult to evaluate whether tax incentives that
flow to gentrifying areas promote equality outside the tax system, thereby justifying
the reduction in vertical tax equity. However, a second equity consideration is more
easily analyzed. Even if we assume that gentrification benefits low-income residents,
the equity gains associated with accelerating gentrification probably are not greater
than the potential equity gains associated with improving distressed neighborhoods
that are otherwise declining or stagnant. Arguably, residents of a non-gentrifying
neighborhood have more to gain from tax-induced improvements than residents of
neighborhoods that have already begun to improve.
As such, the strongest case for using place-based tax incentives, despite their
detrimental impact on vertical equity, is to promote equality in areas that are not
gentrifying.220 The results of this study suggest that the NMTC law has failed to
target such areas. More equitable outcomes could be achieved through statutory or
administrative reforms that reduce the frequency by which NMTC allocations are
directed to gentrifying neighborhoods.
3. Administration of the NMTC
The results of this study have shown that NMTC investment has
disproportionately flowed to areas that exhibit signs of gentrification, despite the
fact that the program is actively administered by the CDFI Fund. It is worth noting
that the CDFI Fund probably plays at least some role in influencing siting patterns
of NMTC projects. The CDFI Fund uses its own set of screening criteria when
weighing tax credit applications. For example, the CDFI Fund considers whether
food-service projects are targeted to food deserts or whether medical facility
projects are targeted to medically underserved areas.221 It also gives special weight
to projects located in areas designated as “severely distressed.”222
Nevertheless, this study found that in many cities, NMTC allocations have
tended to cluster in areas that exhibit signs of gentrification. In addition, this study

217. Slater, supra note 211, at 748.
218. Kathe Newman & Elvin K. Wyly, The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and
Resistance to Displacement in New York City, 43 URB. STUD. 23 (2006).
219. Zuk et al., supra note 23, at 37.
220. See generally Layser, supra note 18, for a discussion of how place-based tax incentives can
promote equality in distressed places by reducing geographic inequality.
221. CDFI Fund, supra note 76.
222. Id.
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revealed significant variations across cities. Both of these findings raise questions
about the role of the CDFI Fund, which administers the program nationally.223
Because the NMTC is centrally administered, one might expect spatial patterns to
be similar across geographies. Variation in the patterns may reflect a limit to the
agency’s capacity to influence the location of tax-subsidized investment.
One likely explanation relates to the realities of the allocation process itself. I
spoke to several CDE professionals with familiarity with the application process.224
Though some indicated that the chances of a successful application were highest
when a specific project pipeline could be described in the application, several
indicated that the projects described in the application are not necessarily the same
as those that are ultimately funded.225 A reason for this disparity is the time lag
between identifying projects—which are real projects in need of funding—and the
receipt of NMTC allocations after an application process that can take six months
or more. By the time the allocations are received, the pipeline projects may no longer
exist. At that point, the CDE must work to identify new projects and distribute the
allocation before it expires. These new projects may be similar to those described
in the application, but they are not the same—and may not be in the same
places—as the ones reviewed by the CDFI Fund.
Another explanation for the regional variation is that the preferences of
investors, CDEs, and other stakeholders outweigh the preferences of the CDFI
Fund in some cities. Another possibility is that state-level NMTC laws (or the
absence thereof) may impact siting patterns. Further research into the role of
state-level NMTC laws and their relationship to federal incentives could help
understand the limits on the CDFI Fund’s capacity to shape tax incentive program
outcomes. To the extent that the CDFI Fund is simply unable to influence siting
patterns, recommendations that rely on more active administration of the NMTC
may fail to improve outcomes. Instead, statutory amendments may be necessary to
specifically exclude gentrifying areas from eligibility.
B. Predicting the Impact of Opportunity Zones
This study has demonstrated that when gentrifying tracts are included within
the scope of eligible census tracts, they may serve as magnets to attract investment
away from other areas. The new Opportunity Zones law may be particularly
susceptible to this result—even more than the NMTC. The reasons are twofold.
223. MARPLES & LOWRY, supra note 72, at 1.
224. Data is confidential per the terms of Institutional Review Board approval. Transcripts on
file with author.
225. When CDEs apply for NMTC allocations, their application describes a pipeline of projects
to be funded through the tax credits. However, the CDE is not required to fund the specific projects
described in the application; the projects that are ultimately funded only need to be consistent with
those approved by the CDFI Fund. For example, assume a CDE represents to the CDFI Fund that it
will use its allocations to fund a hospital project, and it describes a specific project in its application. If
the CDE receives an allocation, it may use those tax credits to fund a different hospital that was not
specifically described in the application. See id.
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First, the Opportunity Zones law lacks active administration comparable to the
competitive allocation process used to administer the NMTC. As a result, the
Opportunity Zones program lacks a potentially moderating regulatory force. The
results of this study showed that even with a competitive application process,
investment tended to cluster in areas with high vacancy rates and increasing rental
rates. Such patterns are likely to be even more visible in the context of Opportunity
Funds, which are not subject to comparable regulatory oversight.
Second, Opportunity Zone investments are more likely to be profit driven
than NMTC investment. The NMTC attracts a reasonably high number of
nonprofit and social-benefit minded investors that may not be motivated solely by
profit.226 In fact, “most NMTC investments do not generate significant economic
return.”227 Instead, NMTC investors, which are almost always large financial
institutions, are motivated by a combination of regulatory benefits and financial
returns derived from the tax credits themselves.228 These types of investors do not
need to maximize profits by investing in gentrifying areas.
In contrast, the Opportunity Zones law overwhelmingly rewards
profit-motivated investors that are more likely than NMTC investors to actively
seek profit opportunities in gentrifying areas.229 The primary benefit of investing in
Opportunity Zones is capital gains relief,230 which is most valuable to taxpayers
whose assets have substantially appreciated. Because the law emphasizes high-profit
investment, Opportunity Zones investors are likely to seek out the most profitable
locations among eligible census tracts, including gentrifying tracts.
For these reasons, the spatial patterns observed in this study are likely to be
even more pronounced in the context of Opportunity Zones. This means that any
inefficient patterns of NMTC investment likely foreshadow inefficiencies in
Opportunity Zones investment as well. It also means that any inequities caused by
these spatial patterns are likely to occur in the Opportunity Zones context. In fact,
such inequities may arise on larger scale. Because the NMTC is a capped program,
it is claimed by a limited number of taxpayers each year. From 2010 to 2019,
Congress authorized $3.5 billion in NMTC allocations annually.231 From 2004 to
2017, an average of 413 allocations were originated per year.232
226. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 11.
227. HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, supra note 77.
228. Id. at 3 (explaining how leveraged structures are used to generate positive rates of return
from the tax credit investment); OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FACT SHEET: NEW
MARKET TAX CREDITS (2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/
community-affairs/community-developments-fact-sheets/ca-fact-sheet-new-markets-tax-credits-feb2016.html (click “Download PDF”) [ https://perma.cc/5XYF-7AQA ] (explaining that banks may
receive credit under the Community Reinvestment Act for NMTC investments).
229. Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 82, 133 (2020); see
also supra Section I.A (explaining the relationship between gentrification and profitability).
230. See supra Section II.B.2.
231. Compare I.R.C. 45D(f)(1)(G) (authorizing $3.5 billion for years 2010–2019), with
I.R.C. 45D(f)(1)(H) (raising the authorized amount to $5 billion for years 2020–2025).
232. Id.
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The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that the Opportunity Zones
law will deliver a comparable amount, $3.5 billion, in capital gains relief each year
through 2022.233 However, unlike the NMTC, which provides a single tax credit
allocation to each CDE (claimed by investors over a seven-year period), the
Opportunities Zones law authorizes a second phase of capital gains relief that is not
captured by the Joint Committee on Taxation’s estimates.234 Opportunity Fund
investors who hold their investments for ten years will receive an additional
exclusion of any post-investment capital gains on their interest235—a benefit that
may prove extremely valuable to high-income taxpayers and costly to
the government.
The capital gains relief provided by the Opportunity Zones law will be claimed
almost exclusively by high-net-worth taxpayers. In 2012, well over half of capital
gains were reported by individual taxpayers who had adjusted gross incomes of one
million dollars or more.236 That same group was responsible for only 0.27% of tax
returns,237 suggesting that a tiny percentage of taxpayers, comprised of some of the
wealthiest Americans, have the greatest need to shelter capital gains in Opportunity
Funds. For this reason, the Opportunity Zones law stands to violate vertical equity
to a greater degree than the NMTC. Meanwhile, as explained above, it is also likely
to result in clustering of investment in gentrifying areas. For these reasons, the
Opportunity Zones law stands to be even more inequitable than the NMTC.
To minimize inefficiencies and inequitable outcomes, designated Opportunity
Zones should be audited, and gentrifying census tracts should be deemed ineligible
for further Opportunity Fund investment. In addition, the tax incentive should be
subject to active administrative oversight, whereby Opportunity Funds would be
required to obtain preapproval for large investments. These safeguards would help
ensure that gentrifying areas do not attract investment away from other Opportunity
Zones, ultimately undermining program objectives.
CONCLUSION
This Article has provided evidence that place-based tax incentives have flowed
to gentrifying census tracts, even when non-gentrifying tracts were eligible for the
same subsidies. Specifically, NMTC projects have been disproportionately located

233. See Jacoby, supra note 28.
234. See also Samantha Jacoby, Potential Flaws of Opportunity Zones Loom, as Do Risks of
Large-Scale Tax Avoidance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES ( Jan. 11, 2019), https://
www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/potential-flaws-of-opportunity-zones-loom-as-do-risks-of-largescale-tax [ https://perma.cc/5HWS-74MU ].
235. See 26 U.S.C.§1400Z-2(c) (excluding all post-investment capital gains after ten years).
236. SOI Tax Stats - Sales of Capital Assets Reported on Individual Tax Returns, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-sales-of-capital-assets-reported-onindividual-tax-returns [ https://perma.cc/RX2G-RZJZ ] (May 14, 2021) (showing that 50.32% of
short-term capital gains and 63.75% of long-term capital gains were reported by taxpayers with adjusted
gross income above $1 million).
237. Id.
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in the eligible census tracts with the highest vacancy rates and increasing rental rates.
These findings suggest that the federal NMTC program suffers from inefficiencies
and violates equity principles, and they raise new questions about the role regulators
have played in its administration. They also provide empirical support to critiques
about the newer, larger Opportunity Zones tax incentive. Even a small number of
Opportunity Zones in gentrifying census tracts may serve to undermine that
program if investment flows disproportionately to those zones, as they have done
in the context of the NMTC. For these reasons, statutory and administrative
reforms are needed to ensure that place-based tax incentives benefit the
neighborhoods that need them most.

